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ABSTRACT

An abstract of the dissertation of Olgay Cangur for the Doctor of Philosophy in
Systems Science presented April 24, 2009.

Title: Modeling Subprime Mortgage Delinquency, Default, Prepayment and Loss

The current financial environment presents significant challenges for the
mortgage industry. Declining house prices have surfaced the importance of
delinquency, loan default and loss predictions. Simple models of prepayment behavior
are no longer applicable. Investors, originators, servicers and regulators are in need of
more accurate predictions for their portfolios of interest.

This dissertation focuses on two topics relevant to modeling residential
mortgages. The first topic provides a framework for modeling delinquencies,
prepayments, defaults and losses that represents an enhancement over previous
studies. A total of nine loan payment statuses are used (current, thirty-days delinquent,
sixty-days delinquent, ninety-days delinquent, early foreclosure, late foreclosure, real
estate owned, paid in full, and terminated with loss). This framework is compared to
the previous framework discussed in the literature that used seven statuses.

The second topic applies reconstructability analysis (RA) to residential
mortgage data in order to find new and interesting models. Many statistical methods
are unable to reflect non-linearities and significant high-level interactions. RA is
capable of doing both. The study explores the hypothesis that the inclusion of RAsuggested interaction terms would improve the accuracy of the logistic regression
(LR) models used to forecast loan status changes within mortgage portfolios.

The first topic's result made two unique and important contributions to the
mortgage management literature. First, it finds that the nine-state framework yields
more accurate results than the seven-state framework. It also introduces a new state
'terminated with loss' that enables the framework to predict losses.

The second topic's results confirm the hypothesis that RA suggested
interaction terms improve the performance of LR model. This is a useful contribution
to the data mining literature since it enhances the performance of LR which is a widely
used data mining methodology.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
1.1 Background and Significance
In 2006, residential home price appreciation (HPA) peaked with a trend that started in
the mid 1990s. In early 2006, the average annual home price increased in the Pacific
and the South Atlantic regions were 18% and 17%, respectively; while the MidAtlantic and the New England regions were 13% and 10%, respectively. Shortly
thereafter, this steep climb turned into a catastrophic decline. Homebuyers'
enthusiasm started to diminish with the declining HPA. Increased delinquencies and
foreclosures led to massive losses on securitized deals that held millions of mortgages.
Investors lost trillions of dollars on financial instruments that were once seen as
reliable as US government Treasury bonds. By the end of 2008, US National Bureau
of Economic Research declared that the US economy was in recession triggered by the
mortgage crisis.

Most of the mortgage originators1 were out of business by mid 2008, and important
financial companies that provide the funding for mortgage businesses like Lehman
Brothers, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Wachovia, Washington Mutual and many
others were either bankrupt or sold by the third or fourth quarter of 2008.

Originators lend money to the borrowers to purchase a new mortgage or refinance their existing
mortgage. They collect similarly originated deals and create pools that are securitized into a financial
security that is then traded by investors.

1

Consequently, servicers2 are facing capacity issues due to higher delinquencies and
foreclosures that are more labor intensive compared to loans that pay regularly.
Delinquencies, foreclosure and loss projections are seen as very important to help
optimize resource allocation. Models used for projection need to be revisited due to
the dramatic shifts in borrowers' behavior following the shift in the economic
conditions.

Published research in mortgage modeling falls into two broad categories: empirical
studies and theoretical development. Empirical models use past behavior to draw
inferences about key inter-relationships in order to create forecasting models.
Theoretical models try to formulate the behavior of borrowers independent of specific
regional, economic and sociologic conditions. These types of models provide general
understanding that is applicable to a broad range of situations and conditions that
borrowers might face.

However, there are drawbacks associated with both methods. Theoretical models try to
formulate the borrowers' behavior mainly based on option theory. This theory assumes
that borrowers try to maximize their wealth by hedging or mitigating their losses.
Theoretical models display the relationship between borrower behavior and economic
conditions. However, their accuracy is questionable. Available theoretical frameworks

Servicers collect the monthly payments from the borrower and remit them to the investor. They also
take care of liquidating the house or any other service related issue regarding the mortgage loan.
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perform poorly against real world (actual) data (Kau, Keenan and Kim (1993);
Lekkas, Quigley and Van Order (1993); Capozza, Kazarian and Thomson (1998)).

On the other hand, empirical models use past behavior to predict future behavior
assuming that economic conditions remain the same. This assumption works well
when a strong housing trend is present, but not when markets are in a state of flux.
Consequently, empirical models lack the flexibility to adjust to rapidly changing
economic conditions beyond their boundaries. These models must be frequently
revised and updated with the changing environment. Most of these empirical works
are not more than complex trend analyses.

Theoretical models in mortgage literature are mostly based on option theory (Black
and Scholes 1973). This work formulated the optimal strategy for valuing stock
options. Subsequent researchers build mortgage valuation models using the option
theory. One of the key assumptions of these models is that the borrower always uses
an optimal strategy in order to maximize his/her wealth. However, this is not the case
in real life. Borrowers face "frictions" that are difficulties in exercising optimal
strategies for several reasons such as loss of job, no cash availability for an optimal
refinancing opportunity, sentimental ownership towards the real estate and free-rent
opportunity when the optimal strategy is to default and leave the house. Researchers
strive to identify and implement these frictions in models in order to enhance the
option theoretic framework and make it more realistic. Another important aspect of

3

these theoretical models is that the stochastic interest rates and home price forecasts
are incorporated to generate an expected value for a specific mortgage.

As mentioned earlier, theoretical models lack accuracy due to the disconnect between
actual borrower behavior and the assumptions made by the models. The use of such
models in the mortgage industry is limited. This gap has been filled by empirical
models, and has been proven to be reasonably accurate for making short-term
predictions in a stable environment. The drawback of empirical models is that the
assumptions need to change over time due to different economic, sociologic, and
regional environmental conditions. These models are built for short-term prediction,
for time periods much shorter than the average life of a mortgage loan.

The present research addresses these drawbacks by developing a comprehensive
computer simulation model that forecasts the future payment statuses of a mortgage
loan. Implied cash flows based on predicted future payment statuses enable
researchers to price complex subprime securitizations3. The model uses a combination
of theoretical and empirical frameworks to predict future delinquencies, future defaults
and future prepayments. It utilizes logistic regression, Monte Carlo simulation, and a
new system research methodology called reconstructability analysis. The following
sections describe the research objectives and provide an overview of the methods.

3

Securitized deals are pooled mortgage loans, to create mortgage securities to be sold similar to bonds
(Fabozzi 1992)

1.2 Specific Aims
This research carries out two inter-related studies in order to better forecast important
aspects of subprime mortgages:

1) Prediction of delinquency transition and the frequency of prepayment4 and default:
This research develops and tests an enhanced model with additional loan statuses
('Early and Late Foreclosure', 'Terminated with Loss' and 'Paid in Full') compared to
previously published models. The performance of the enhanced model is then
compared against other models in the literature.

2) Identifying interaction effects between the key variables of the payment model:
This is an area that has been under-researched in the literature. A new methodology is
used to identify significant interactions which then are introduced into predictive
models and tested. Reconstructability analysis is used to detect and quantify
statistically significant interactions that may be economically relevant.

1.3 Overview of Methods
1) 9-State Payment model: Delinquency prediction is an important aspect of mortgage
analytics, because it serves as an early indicator of potential losses. Delinquency
behavior is usually modeled by a Markov transition matrix, where each cell contains

4

Prepayment is the payment of the loan earlier than its maturity date. This action results in less total
future cash flows for that loan.
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the probability for each transition from different beginning and ending loan states for a
given period. This period is usually one month while the numbers of states differ in
the literature. The early literature indicates two states for a loan: 'Active' and 'Paid
off. Later, a three-state model added the "defaulted" state. The most recently reported
model (De Franco 2002) has seven states: 'Current', '30-days delinquent', '60-days
delinquent', '90+ days delinquent', 'Foreclosure', 'REO 5 ' and 'Paid Off. This present
study includes an 'Early Foreclosure' status and a 'Late Foreclosure' instead of a
single 'Foreclosure' status and also adds a 'Terminated with Loss' status. The 9-State
model improves the understanding of the prepayment, delinquency, default and loss
process. The accuracy of this new framework is compared to the 7-State model
discussed in the literature. The measure of accuracy is the absolute error between the
actual and predicted values. A hypothesis test is conducted on predictions from both
models' results using the Mann-Whitney method in order to test whether the 9-State
model performs significantly better than the 7-State model.

2) Interaction effects: The previous mortgage literature focuses on the use of statistical
models to predict the behavior of the mortgage loans. These models use independent
variables determined by the researcher to explain the behavior of the dependent
variable. One downside of this type of approach is that these statistical models often
ignore the possible interaction effects among the independent variables. The
reconstructability analysis (RA) method in the information theoretic literature is a

5

REO: Real Estate Owned - Loans owned by the bank or the servicer that is in charge of liquidating the
house.
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robust technique that identifies such interactions and analyzes them to determine their
significance. The web-based RA tool OCCAM6 is utilized for both the exploratory and
the confirmatory analyses. Its results are tested to enhance the logistic regression
models that predict the transitions. Incorporating interaction effects will not only
improve the logistic regressions in the 9-state model presented in this research, but
also the logistic regression analyses in general. A Chi-square test, at the model level, is
utilized to confirm the hypothesis that the interaction terms explored using RA
significantly improve the logistic regression.

Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature including sections on mortgage loan
prepayment, loan default, and loan loss. The pertinent modeling, simulation, Monte
Carlo method, logistic regression and RA literature is also reviewed. Chapter 3
describes the research methodology, including the models and how their performance
is tested and compared with existing models that are used in practice and discussed in
the literature. Chapter 4 provides the results of both payment model and interaction
effects research, and Chapter 5 discusses the conclusions drawn from the study, and
presents the discussion including recommendations and identifies areas of future
research.

6

OCCAM is a web-based reconstructability analysis program that can be accessed from
http://dmm.sysc.pdx.edu/occam/weboccam.cgi
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
A mortgage loan is an instrument for which cash flow is unknown because the
borrower has an alternative to prepay or to default at any time. These uncertainties are
called the prepayment risk7 and the default risk (Fabozzi, 1992). Researchers have
applied both option theory and econometric techniques to estimate this uncertainty and
forecast the performance to arrive at a value for a mortgage loan. Such forecasts are
critical for investment decision-making.

Early literature started with determining prepayment risk for conventional mortgage
loans, known as prime loans. These loans are assumed to have no default risk due to
the underwriting guidelines by government agencies such as GNMA, FNMA and
FHLMC. Thus, the literature concentrates on the borrower's behavior of selling the
house, refinancing the mortgage, and the rare case of paying off the loan.

Following the introduction of high yield non-agency8 loans in the mortgage markets
(subprime and Alt-A with higher credit risk), the default option of the mortgage
borrower became a significant research interest. Researchers have investigated the

7

If loans in a deal pay in full before their maturity, the future cash flow of the deal degrades assuming
everything else is held constant.
8
Loans that are not guaranteed by government agencies GNMA, FNMA and FHLMC. Subprime and
Alternative-A loans fall into this category. These loans either have borrowers with impaired credit or
somehow do not qualify to become prime loans that are guaranteed by the agency.
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delinquencies and the probability of default related to these delinquencies. In addition,
researchers have concentrated on the losses incurred on the mortgage loan.
Today, there are comprehensive models that forecast prepayment, delinquency, default
and loss. These models operate by using various statistical modeling techniques that
determine the risk of the mortgage investment. The forecast is run in conjunction with
computer models that utilize simulation techniques such as Monte Carlo. Results are
used for either valuation or by servicers to proactively manage their resources, such as
human resources and call campaigns; also to help with pricing of mortgage servicing
rights (PMSR).

Recently used methods include survival analysis, multinomial logistic regression,
multiple regression, and Monte-Carlo simulation. Survival analysis is commonly used
in prepayment literature. It is also utilized by the foreclosure and REO timeline
researchers. Multinomial logistic regression is frequently used in the delinquency,
default and loss literature due to its ability to generate probabilities for multiple
outcomes. Monte Carlo simulation is used in pricing mortgage loans, especially when
the models utilize option theory, sensitivity analyses and various future scenarios.

9

The literature review comprises four main areas:

1.

Prepayment

2.

Loan Default and Delinquency

3.

Loss

4.

Reconstructability Analysis, Monte Carlo Method and Logistic
Regression

Section 2.2 presents the prepayments and expands on categories of prepayments;
while Section 2.3 presents the literature for loan defaults and its relation with
delinquencies and losses; Section 2.4 reviews research for loss and loss severities;
while Section 2.5 discusses the literature of reconstructability analysis, Monte Carlo
method and logistic regression.
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2.2 Prepayment Literature
Prepayments are classified into three different categories by Hayre 2001:

•

Home Sales

•

Refinancing

•

Curtailments and Full Payoffs

These categories play a critical role in the valuation of mortgage-backed securities.
The various model projections are used by investors to manage their risks and plan
their investment strategies.

One reason prepayment occurs is because of housing turnover. For instance, the
borrower may decide to sell the property, which will terminate the contract resulting in
a change in future cash flows. This behavior mostly depends on the following factors
(Hayre 2001):

•

Overall turnover rate: Percentage of all existing homes likely to be sold in a
given period

•

Relative mobility: Variability in the likelihood of moving due to different
borrower demographics

•

Seasoning: Variability in the likelihood of borrower moving after the time the
loan was originated.
11

•

Lock-in Effect: The effect of having a mortgage rate that is below the current
mortgage rates. This reduces the likelihood of home sales.

Refinancing is another reason for prepayments. Borrowers choose to maximize their
wealth by renewing their existing mortgage contract in various ways. Theoretically,
this behavior should happen when the refinancing cost, together with the new
mortgage value, is less than the existing mortgage value. This occurs with some delay
on the borrowers' side; borrowers tend not to refinance optimally due to timing
reasons in their refinancing decisions (Archer and Ling, 1993).

Refinancing can be looked at from the option theory point of view. It is the exercise of
the call option that is implicit in the contract. The literature has many models that
utilize the option theoretic approach. Most of these models endogenously generate
interest rates and housing prices using Monte Carlo simulation techniques to value the
refinancing option of the borrower. Since these models work under the assumption
that the borrower will exercise the call option optimally, they tend to generate skewed
results in adverse economic conditions (Kau, Keenan and Kim, 1993).

The key components regarding refinancing are (Hayre 2001):

•

Refinancing Incentive: Borrower compares his/her mortgage rate to the
available incentives in the market.
12

•

Bumout: A decline in the refinancing rates even if no change occurs in the
refinancing incentive.

•

Diversity in the borrower types: Each borrower has unique characteristics that
account for the refinancing.

•

Changes in the refinancing environment: Regulatory, technological, market or
borrower changes may affect the refinancing behavior.

Curtailment (partial payoff) and full payoff are additional options borrowers may
choose when paying their mortgage debt. Even though they are less likely to be
exercised, the rates might be significant when the loans are seasoned and the
remaining balance is low. Another reason involves the demographics of the borrowers.
For example, borrowers who are retired or close to retirement might be more likely to
exercise full or partial payoff.

Hayre (2001) argues that since borrowers make use of mortgage interest payments as
tax deductions, they are less likely to prepay fully without selling their homes or
without refinancing. On the other hand, Chinloy (1993) indicates that the net present
worth of future monthly mortgage payments is reduced when the borrower makes
partial prepayments.
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Key literature in prepayments follows:

Dunn and McConnell (1981) examine the impact of amortization, call, and
prepayment features on the prices, risks and expected returns of GNMA securities9.
The amortization and prepayment features each have a positive effect on price, while
the call feature has a negative impact. These features reduce the interest rate of
GNMA securities, consequently decreasing their expected return.

Hall (1985) introduces the option theory to the prepayment literature. He suggests the
idea that a mortgage can be seen as having options (payoff, default); and option theory
can be useful to explain the behavior of mortgages. He also addresses the
complications that arise while applying option theory to mortgage concepts. For
example, non-optimal prepayment is a major issue and one of the key limitations of
his model.

Schwartz and Torous (1989) implement a new valuation framework building on Dunn
and McConnell's work (1981). Schwartz and Torous use a conditional probability of
prepayment, rather than imposing an optimal value minimizing call condition to
prepay. This probability depends on the state of the economy. To implement this idea,

9

GNMA - Government National Mortgage Association, a government-owned agency which buys
mortgages from lending institutions, securitizes them, and then sells them to investors. Because the
payments to investors are guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Government, they return
slightly less interest than other mortgage-backed securities.
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they use the maximum-likelihood techniques (logit) to estimate a prepayment function
in light of recent aggregate GNMA pool prepayment experiences.

Cunningham and Capone (1990) utilize multinomial logistic regression to analyze
termination in adjustable- and fixed-rate mortgages. They conclude that interest-rate
expectations affect fixed-rate mortgage terminations more strongly than adjustablerate mortgage terminations. They also point out that loan-to-value ratio and debt-toincome ratio are the cornerstone determinants. They group variables into four
categories: macroeconomic, mortgage related, property related, and borrower related.

Kang and Zenios (1992) discuss the development of prepayment models for pools of
fixed-rate mortgages. They identify the key factors determining the prepayment rates
as refinancing incentive, seasonal variations, seasoning of the mortgage pool, and the
burnout effect. They build a model for each factor and calibrate their models using
historical data. The multiplicative effects of each model determine the overall
prepayment rate of the mortgage pool.

Schwartz and Torous (1992) investigate the interaction of prepayment and default
decisions in the valuation process. Default decisions affect the timing of the cash
flows in a mortgage pool, consequently affecting the value of the pool. They
investigate the equilibrium valuation of the default insurance. They assume that the
equilibrium insurance fee varies with the interest rate, and interest-rate volatility and

15

the value of the underlying collateral. The results indicated that default insurance is
not properly priced.

Archer and Ling (1993) claim that residential mortgage borrowers behave suboptimally with respect to their mortgage prepayment options. They develop a rational
model of mortgage prepayment that incorporates non-optimal prepayment behavior.
Their model handles the effects of interest-rate-motivated refinancing as well as noninterest-rate driven prepayment. Their paper also discusses the burnout effect within
the mortgage pool.

Schwartz and Torous (1993) use a large data sample to assess the prepayment
behavior of individual homeowners. Poisson regression is employed to estimate the
parameters of a proportional hazards model for prepayment decision. Poisson
regression handles time dependent covariates, multiple time scales, and nonproportionality better than the previous methods employed. They conclude that
prepayments are affected by refinancing opportunities as well as regional differences.

McConnell and Singh (1994) introduce a dynamic programming model in which an
individual mortgagor's decision to prepay is the feedback control variable. The
mortgagor seeks to minimize the value of the mortgage subject to refinancing costs.
The researchers use Monte Carlo method and conduct extensive sensitivity analyses to
determine the robustness of this dynamic programming approach.

16

Stanton (1995) presents a new model of mortgage prepayments based on rational
decisions by mortgage holders. The results indicate that mortgage holders act as
though they face transaction costs that far exceed the explicit costs usually incurred on
refinancing. These holders also wait an average of one year before refinancing even
when it is optimal to do so earlier. In general, this article extends the option theoretic
approach in order to better explain borrower frictions in prepayment.

Hakim (1997) estimates prepayment probabilities as a function of borrower
characteristics, the loan characteristics, regional, and economical variables. He
distinguishes induced prepayments from autonomous prepayments. Non-interest
effects reveal the significance of the borrower's characteristics, property age and
regional mobility rates on mortgage termination.

Yang, Buist and Megbolugbe (1996) introduce household income as the third
stochastic variable in addition to the interest rate and house price appreciation (HPA).
The presence of these variables allows consideration of consumption-theoretic
determinants of mortgage termination. Also, the mortgage underwriting rules that
restrict optimal prepayment is also explicitly modeled (such as prepayment penalties
and due-on-sale clauses and so forth).

Lacour-Little and Chun (1999) investigate the effect of third party originators (TPOs).
TPOs are mortgage brokers who have strong economic incentives to encourage

17

borrowers to refinance. The authors report the effect of TPOs on securities in terms of
prepayments. Prepayments increase as the number of TPOs increase.

Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000) present a unified model of competing risks of
mortgage termination by prepayment and default. The model estimates these two
probabilities jointly assuming they are dependent competing risks. They report that the
borrowers with high loan-to-value (LTV) ratios loans are more likely to exercise their
option of either prepaying or defaulting. The initial LTV ratio may reflect investor
preferences for risk in the market for mortgages on owner-occupied housing. They
conclude that a simple option model is not sufficient to explain the variability in actual
prepayments and defaults.

Ambrose and Lacour-Little (2001) employ the risk methodology developed by Deng,
Quigley and Van Order (2000). They conclude that loan age has a negative effect on
prepayment risk for ARMs. This is consistent with the phenomenon that borrowers
with high mobility and high propensity to refinance exit the pool early. They also note
that loans with higher margins, higher spread compared to current fixed rates and
loans originated by TPOs are more likely to prepay. Prepayments concentrate around
the first and the second reset adjustments, subsequent adjustments did not produce
significant effects.

Lacour-Little, Marschoun and Maxam (2002) emphasize the non-linear nature of the
prepayment function. They also indicate use of non-parametric techniques in non18

linear and multivariate interaction conditions. The authors employed a kernel
regression technique on loan level data to produce a non-parametric model of
prepayment behavior. Kernel regression results indicate an R2 = 38.89%, an increase
of nearly 5% in explaining the variability over the linear regression model.

Prepayment Literature Synthesis
Researchers focus on two important reasons for prepayments. The first reason is home
sales, which depend on the housing turnover rate, mobility of borrowers, loan
seasoning and lock-in effect10. The second reason is refinancing, which depends on the
refinancing incentive, burnout effect, diversity of the borrower and the changing
environment in the refinancing market. Important topics in the literature are listed
below:

•

Option theoretic framework is useful in formulating the behavior of the
borrower. However, the borrower's non-optimal prepayment decision is not
easy to incorporate. Researchers conclude that pure option theoretic models are
not sufficient to explain the variability in prepayments.

•

Seasonal variations, refinancing incentive, loan age, and the burnout effect are
key components of empirical models.

The effect of having a mortgage rate that is below the current mortgage rates.
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•

The interaction between default and prepayment behavior is significant and is
incorporated into the theoretic framework as noted in the literature as
competing risks.

•

Borrowers behave sub-optimally with respect to their mortgage prepayment.

•

Interest rate, LTV, DTI11, refinancing opportunities, property age, house prices
and regional mobility rates affect the prepayment.

•

Household income, interest rates and house prices as stochastic variables
significantly explain prepayment behavior.

Debt to income ratio of the borrower at the origination of the loan.

2.3 Loan Default Literature
Delinquency starts when the borrower misses a payment on his contract. Multiple
missed payments eventually lead to the foreclosure process. The borrower can start to
make the payments to eliminate the delinquency and the foreclosure, or the borrower
may choose to not pay further on the loan resulting in default. It is usually defined as
loans with four or more delinquent payments. Following the default, the house is
liquidated and the loan amount is paid to the investor if the amount is higher than the
net liquidation proceeds of the house.

One of the earliest studies on the default topic is by Morton (1975). He uses
discriminant function analysis to determine the impact of the independent variables on
current, delinquent and foreclosed mortgages. His findings indicate that borrowers
with higher number of dependents are more likely to default. He also shows that threefamily property, LTV, junior financing and existence of non-real estate debt are
effective in predicting the likelihood of defaulting. The DTI is not significantly related
to loan default or delinquency.

Vandell and Thibodeau (1985) formulate a theoretical model to investigate the
behavior of default. Their theoretical model is based on optimizing borrower wealth.
Their objective is to better understand the reasons for default beyond the equity related
decisions of the borrower. Their hypotheses find the following effects significantly
impact the default decision:
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•

Payment levels relative to income

•

Current and expected housing market conditions

•

Economic conditions

•

Wealth

•

Borrower characteristics proxying for variability in income or "crisis" events

•

Transaction costs incurred upon default

They conclude that some of these variables dominate the equity effect on default and
help explain the non-optimal default decision. Another important conclusion from this
study is that non-equity effects could not be ignored.

Epperson, Kau, Keenan and Muller (1985) introduce option theory into the mortgage
default literature, specifically the model by Black and Scholes (1973). Their
simulation results show the sensitivity to the volatility of house prices and interest
rates. They suggest that their research is an initial step towards modeling mortgagebacked securities from the option-theoretic perspective.

Cooperstein, Redburn and Meyers (1991) confirm the powerful influence of equity on
mortgage defaults and the strong influence of interest rates on both defaults and
prepayments. The interest rate effect explains the default behavior in periods of
substantial economic fluctuations.
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The irrational, non-wealth maximizing behavior of borrowers hinders the explanatory
power of option-based pricing models. Kau, Keenan and Kim (1993) include
transaction costs and sub-optimal termination behavior to overcome this problem. This
is a step towards explaining the gap between empirical and theoretical approaches.
Kau et al. show that transaction costs have a stronger influence on default than the
influence of sub-optimal termination on default. However, both concepts are not as
powerful as expected in explaining the irrational borrower behavior. They recommend
future work to determine the difference between the actual default behavior and the
predictions of option-based pricing of mortgages.

Hendershott and Schultz (1993) investigate the effect of negative equity. They binned
LTVs into six categories and loan sizes into seven categories. Higher LTV means
higher default rates and larger loan sizes are reported to have less defaults. They
conclude that this is due to higher priced houses tending to more appreciate in prices.
They also note that unemployment rate and the book value of borrower equity also are
significant determinants of default as well as their interaction.

Jones (1993) models the role of moving, moral aversion, and deficiency costs in
determining whether exercising the default option in home mortgage loans is rational.
These factors can be considered as additional "frictions" regarding the borrower's
default decision.
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Kau and Kim (1994) conclude that a rational individual might not exercise the put
option (default) in the mortgage contract as soon as the anticipated cost of payments
exceeds the house price. They indicate that there is considerable benefit if the house
price increases in the near future. Defaulting at a later date might mitigate the
consequences to the borrower. The cost to this strategy is the required monthly
mortgage payment. Their important conclusion is that the observed delay in default,
which is usually attributed to transaction costs, instead can be explained as an entirely
rational choice in a dynamic environment.

Vandell (1995) discusses the usefulness of option-theoretic models in understanding
the default behavior, but also points out their lack of accuracy. Consequently, he
recommended the use of techniques such as Poisson regression used by Schwartz and
Torous (1993) to enhance their model's explanatory power.

VanderHoff (1996) compares the adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) defaults to the
fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) defaults. His findings indicate that the ARM loans default
more often than FRMs. The anticipated increase in interest rate has a larger impact on
the ARM holders default decision compared to the anticipated payment increase. He
concludes that ARM holders are less mobile than the FRM holders. His study supports
the notion that defaults are not just due to negative equity in the house. He indicates
that most of the observed defaults stopped paying when they actually had positive
equity.
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Deng, Quigley and Order (1996) emphasize the importance of current loan-to-value
ratio in default modeling. They analyze the effect of down payment on default. They
test the effect of unemployment, average annual house price change, household
income and down payment rate. Their findings indicate a high sensitivity to LTV ratio.

Ambrose, Buttimer and Capone (1997) model the time between default and
foreclosure, called the "free rent". Their goal is to determine the value associated with
such delay. They report that the probability of default increases as borrower
expectations of delay between default and foreclosure increase. The probability of
default decreases as borrowers expectations on the probability of the deficiency
judgments increased. Lenders can alter borrower behavior by raising the transaction
costs associated with the default. This would result in the reduction of the time
between default and foreclosure. They conclude that the FHA/VA mortgage insurance
could be lowered by actively seeking deficiency judgments similar to the conventional
loans.

The role of age, LTV, rent-to-price ratio, trigger events and transaction costs are
investigated using option-based modeling approach in Capozza, Kazarian, and
Thomson (1997). They find a significant effect of trigger events and transaction costs
on default. LTV, as usual, are the strongest reason for defaults. Their most notable
finding is the negative correlation between rent-to-price ratio and defaults. They also
indicate the significance of unemployment and divorce rates on defaults.
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Unlike the previous default studies focus on foreclosures in one-step decision
framework, Ambrose and Capone (1996) find that a foreclosure is one possible
outcome of a default scenario. They note that the foreclosure is a separate event,
conditioned upon both an initial default decision and subsequent changes in the
economic environment. They state that mortgage servicers should understand the
dynamic effect of key variables such as interest rates and house price appreciations
during a default. This may lead to a significant understanding of the borrower
behavior during the default period. Finally, they conclude that a servicer should
identify which borrower is truly affected by a trigger event and offer them loss
mitigating and foreclosure-avoiding options.

Capozza, Kazarian and Thomson (1998) introduce a new term called conditional
probability of default. This is different from unconditional probability of default
because it uses the most current data on the loan rather than just the origination data.
The gap between empirical studies and the option-pricing methods arise from this
notion. One important result is that variables important unconditionally, such as rental
rate, interest rate reversion and interest rate volatility, are secondary in importance
conditionally. They also conclude that trigger events, interest rate volatility and
transactions costs have little effect and can be removed from the empirical models in
order to reduce the risk of misspecification bias. Another distinct finding is that
interest rate increase from origination rate reduces the probability of default since the
option is "in the money" (meaning it is reasonable to continue making payments).

Their study also reinforces the idea that CLTV is the key variable for predicting
default.

Investigation on low-income neighborhoods by Van Order and Zorn (2000) reveal that
both borrower income and neighborhood income is related to default. They also
indicate that neighborhood income has stronger relationship with default than
borrower income. High-income borrowers tend to default more; however their loss
severities are lower. Typically, the relationship of LTV with default and severity is
strongly inversely related.

Loss mitigation is the process by which lenders attempt to minimize losses associated
with foreclosure. Lenders and servicers lean towards adopting loss mitigation tactics
rather than simply foreclosing on a defaulted loan. Ambrose and Buttimer (2000)
formulate a mortgage-pricing model that fully specifies all possible borrower options
embedded in the mortgage contract, such as reinstatement, forbearance13, and antideficiency judgment. They also determine the value of credit on borrower default
behavior.

Giving the option of forbearance to a borrower increases the delinquency, but also
increases reinstatements out of foreclosure, referred to as "cures". Researchers show
that creating an economic incentive such as waiving the default penalty can create an
12

Current loan-to-value ratio. Since CLTV has the most current data compared to LTV which is an
origination value.
13
A type of payment plan where the borrower accepts a stipulated agreement.
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optimal cure condition for the borrowers in a stable economic environment. Ambrose
and Buttimer (2000) also indicate the importance of the value of credit from
borrowers' perspective, and recommend the use of future credit degradation to
reinforce the impression that default is costly.

Ambrose, Capone, and Deng (2001) note the interaction effect of house-price-cyclestage with the probability of negative equity. They employ a simulation using Monte
Carlo method. As the housing prices enter into a significant downturn, the probability
of negative equity and default relationship breaks down. This leads to more defaults
even though the optimal default scenario is not reached.

A dynamic modeling approach by Calhoun and Deng (2002) uses multinomial logit to
specify quarterly the conditional variables in their modeling environment. They
analyze the different termination behavior of fixed-rate and adjustable-rate mortgages.
The estimated impact of option theoretic variables on conditional probability of
default is the same across both FRM and ARM borrowers. Any difference in
behaviors of both types of borrowers can be explained by other fixed effects. These
can be alternative motivations of each type for borrower. Age of the mortgage, year of
origination, original LTV, and relative loan size also are indicated empirically
significant in explaining default behavior.
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Alexander et al. (2002) investigate the effect of TPO loans on default probabilities.
They compare TPOs to retail originated loans. They observe that there is a significant
difference between the two types of origination. This is due to TPOs being
compensated for the origination but not held accountable for subsequent performance
of the loan.

More recently in the literature, it is observed that the use of multinomial logistic
regression modeling is becoming essential. Phillips and VanderHoff (2004) utilize the
multinomial logistic regression model to determine possible outcomes of a defaulted
scenario. Three outcomes are considered: the resumption of payments, termination by
prepayment, and foreclosure. Findings indicate that the local area economics and
housing market conditions affect the default resolution probabilities. They conclude
that efficiency of default resolutions might be improved by legal and regulatory
reforms. State specific legal statutes and regulations lead them to this conclusion.

The variables in their model are listed below:

•

Mortgage value, equity, appreciation, income growth, age of the loan,
defaulted time, workout flag indicating any workout option offered to the
borrower, mortgage insurance flag, redemption period, tenancy flag, Texas and
Florida indicator variables
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LaCour-Little (2004) defines equity dilution as the additional debt secured on the
house by a junior lien subsequent to the first loan origination. This is an important
issue since it has a major impact on the equity of the borrower. Since junior liens are
generally unobservable to the senior lien holder, predictions for default might be
skewed. He estimates loans that are likely to have junior liens and examined their
effect on default probabilities for senior lien holders.
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Loan Default Literature Synthesis
Methods used in the default literature are discriminant function analysis, survival
analysis, logistic regression, Monte Carlo simulation and optimization.
Important variables used in default research are: CLTV, transaction cost of default,
borrower income, expected housing conditions, interest rate, existing borrower equity,
down payment at origination, loan age, rent to price ratio, trigger events,
unemployment rates, divorce rates, neighborhood income, year of origination and
third party origination etc.

Utilizing the option theoretic framework, Kau and Kim (1994) concluded that
borrowers could benefit from delaying their default when the HPA is in an increasing
trend. Vandell (1995) determines that the option theoretic framework is not sufficient
to explain the variability in defaults, and suggest using Poisson regression together
with Monte Carlo simulations will do better.

Quigley, Deng and Order (1996) use three stochastic variables: interest rates, house
prices, and household income. Ambrose, Buttimer and Capone (1998) model the value
of free rent, which corresponds to the time between the default and the foreclosure
sale. They conclude that the default is likely to happen when the borrower's
expectation of free-rent-time increases.
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Capozza, Kazarian and Thomson (1998) introduce the notion of conditional
probability of default, bridging the gap between the empirical and theoretical studies
of mortgage default research. They indicate that the unconditional probabilities are
secondary in importance compared to the conditional probabilities. They determine
that unconditional probabilities depend on the origination values of the variables of
interest where as the conditional probability depends on the current values of those
variables.

Ambrose, Capone and Deng (2001) note the interaction effect of house price cycle
stage with the probability of negative equity. They conclude that as the house prices
significantly degrade the relationship between the probability of negative equity and
default breaks down.

DeFranco (2002) proposes a modeling framework and tests it against several classes
of traditional mortgage prepayment and default models. His framework consists of
multinomial logistic regression and Markov transition matrix for seven payment
statuses. He concludes that his model is statistically and economically better than the
previous models. He uses goodness of fit measures, statistical tests and out-of-sample
forecasts.

Lacour-Little (2004) defines the equity dilution as the additional debt secured on the
house by a junior lien subsequent to the first loan origination. He concludes that such
loans are more prone to default.

2.4 Loss Literature
As mentioned earlier, a defaulted loan might incur losses. The loss literature
concentrates on two key definitions:

•

Frequency of loss: This is the probability of default given the current
conditions.

•

Loss severity: This is the loss amount relative to the defaulted balance given
the condition of default. It depends on, but is not limited to, the factors listed
below:
o

Current loan-to-value ratio

o

Default period

o

Age of the loan

o

Final default resolution

o

Cost of servicing

The literature on this topic is limited compared to the prepayment and loan default
literature. The trend towards high-risk and high-yield products in 1990s and early
2000s increased the demand for predicting future losses on mortgage-backed
securities. Subprime mortgage loans fit well into this definition and their loss
behaviors are different from conventional prime mortgage loans. Earlier literature on
prime loans ignores the probability of default or assumes it has no impact on the final
valuation of the loan.
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In recent literature, Capozza and Thomson (2005) outline a two-stage process for
losses in subprime loans. The first stage is when the borrower stops making payments
depending on the optimality of default. The second stage is the period when the
lenders initiate the liquidation of the collateral through their mortgage servicer. Their
study explored the role of following key characteristics:

•

Borrower characteristics

•

Collateral characteristics

•

Judicial Process

•

Trigger Events

•

Option theory variables and loan terms

They conclude that the traditional approaches in academic literature that focus on
option pricing methods are difficult to quantify. They have significant effect but little
power to explain the variation in the default decision; however, borrower
characteristics play an important role in determining the stopping boundary (frequency
of default) and eventual total losses (loss severity). Property characteristics and legal
requirements also have impact on the total loss. Surprisingly, trigger events such as
unemployment and divorce did not appear to have a significant effect on the frequency
of loss and loss severity.
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One of the key papers in loss severity by Kau and Keenan (1999) is an important
attempt to identify the severity of default. They propose that origination LTV is an
important variable that determines the severity levels. This contradicts the findings of
Lekkas et al. (1993); however, Kau and Keenan (1999) explain that the reason for this
difference is the use of different severity measures. Lekkas et al. use severity rates and
severity levels. They also report that as the interest rate of the mortgage contract
increases, the probability of default increases; but the loss severity decreases. With
imposed house price volatility both the severity and the probability of default
increases. Seasoning only impacts the probability of default; the severity remains the
same.

Kau and Keenan (1999) indicate that there are three reasons for why subprime
borrowers end up with higher loss severities:

•

Subprime borrowers are generally less skilled in property care and
maintenance compared to prime borrowers

•

They are generally less knowledgeable about property values and are likely to
overpay for the property at the purchase time

•

They may be buying properties that appreciate less and deteriorate faster

Ambrose and Capone (2000) investigate the hazard rates of repeated mortgage
defaults, conditioned on reinstatement from an initial default. They conclude that the
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two-year period for the subsequent default following the first default is riskier than
periods more than two years for reinstated borrowers (payment plans, modifications
and so forth). This is an important conclusion for current investors and servicers since
the industry is working to avoid foreclosures.

The dynamics of borrower default and the conditions that result in foreclosures are
gaining importance as mortgage lenders and servicers realize that loss mitigation
efforts can reduce the incidence of foreclosures. These foreclosure forbearance
programs are essential to lenders and servicers to reduce mortgage losses. Ambrose
and Capone (2000) report that for 3,345 loans that are reinstated after the initial
default, 22% defaulted, and none of them prepaid during the analysis period. They use
financial, borrower and state specific characteristics to identify the number of months
to the second default, given the first default.

Clauretie (1990) examine the effect of LTV ratio at origination on the frequency of
default and on the loss severity of a defaulted loan. LTV account for between 13% and
23% of the variability for years 1980 and 1983, respectively. This study is conducted
on 204,706 loans from the Federal Housing Association (FHA) originated in between
1980 and 1983.

Another important finding in the literature is the relation of frequency of loss to the
loss severity. A study by Crawford and Rosenblatt (1995) indicates that the variables
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that increase severity are the same variables that reduce the probability of default. This
indicates that default probability and loss severity are not independent.

They also indicate that the foreclosure decision of servicer does not obtain differences
in severity across states and across market interest rates. This implies that the severity
is not dependent on the servicer's performance in foreclosure process.

One of the most important studies in the loss frequency and loss severity field is by
Lekkas, Quigley and Van Order (1993). This study uses the option theory to determine
the optimal mortgage default from the perspective of the borrower. Their option
theoretic model predictions (below) are tested:

•

Loss severity should be independent of initial LTV

•

Loss severity should be the same in regions with high default frequencies and
should be independent of loan's origination year

•

Loss severity should decrease with the age of the mortgage

•

Loss severity should decrease as coupon rate minus the current interest rate
decreases

The option-pricing model outcomes listed above are not consistent with the empirical
data from years 1975-1990. The empirical data didn't support their theoretical
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framework. Thus, they conclude that the borrower behavior is not consistent with the
wealth maximization notion.

Overall, option-pricing models identify an optimal point where a borrower needs to
default independently of region and initial LTV ratios. These hypotheses are rejected
in several studies by Lekkas, Quigley and Van Order (1993), and Capone and Deng
(1998). DeFranco (2002) indicate that these studies show the need for expanding the
set of information used to predict severity beyond the existing option theoretic
methods.

Other studies such as Smith and Lawrence (1993), Wilson (1995), Smith, Sanchez and
Lawrence (1996) base their estimation on empirical methods for estimating the losses
and loss severities. The variables in their studies are listed below:

Loan size, lender, LTV, property type, county, change in home prices, house price
appreciation by state, indicator variables for being '30- or 60-days delinquent' in the
last 12 months, logarithmic transformation of loan age, original and estimated current
LTV, initial interest rate, maturity, borrower's age and occupation, average
foreclosure time, number of months for right of redemption, indicator variable for
judicial foreclosure, state level unemployment data, borrowers income.
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Loss Literature Synthesis
Frequency of default and severity of loss are the key focus of researchers in the loss
literature. Default frequency multiplied by the loss severity will give the expected loss
on a single loan. This expected loss can be used for valuation purposes. It also will
determine the cumulative loss within a pool of mortgage loans.

Capozza and Thomson (2005) conclude that option-pricing methods have significant
effect but little power to explain the variation in the default decision. They also
indicate that the borrower and property characteristics and legal requirements have
impact on frequency and severity of loss. The trigger events do not affect the severity.

Kau and Keenan (1999) propose that with interest rate increases loss frequency
increases, but the severity decreases. House price volatility increase results with an
increase in loss severity and frequency. Seasoning only affects the severity of the loss
where as frequency remains unchanged.

Ambrose and Capone (2000) research the hazard rates of repeated mortgage defaults,
conditional on reinstating from an initial default episode. They conclude that the
subsequent default for the reinstated borrowers (payment plans, modifications and so
forth) has significantly greater risk than the first default in the first two years
following the first default.
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Clauretie (1990) examines the effect of LTV ratio on the frequency of default and on
the loss severity of a defaulted loan. LTV accounts for between 13% and 23% of the
variability for years 1980-1983.

Crawford and Rosenblatt (1995) indicate that the variables that increase the severity
are the variables that reduce the probability of default. This implies that default
probability and loss severity are not independent.

DeFranco (2002) indicates that these studies show the need for expanding the set of
information used to predict severity beyond the existing option theoretic methods.

2.5 Reconstructability Analysis, Monte Carlo Method, and Logistic Regression
Reconstructability Analysis
RA is a discrete multivariate modeling method. It includes both set-theoretic modeling
of relationships and mappings, and information-theoretic modeling of frequency and
probability distributions. System types can be both directed having input and output
variables or neutral without input or output distinction. Zwick (2004) indicates that
RA was developed by Klir (1986) together with Broekstra, Cavallo, Cellier, Conant,
Jones, and Krippendorff (1986).

RA is a method for detecting and analyzing the structure of multivariate categorical
data (Zwick 2004). The method is similar to log-linear analysis (Knoke & Burke
1980) of multi-way frequency tables in statistics. Where RA overlaps with log-linear
analysis, the two methods are equivalent. There are, however, a number of aspects of
RA methodology that are not present in log-linear analysis, and vice versa. One
general difference is that RA is especially suited for exploratory as opposed to
confirmatory modeling. The biggest difference from standard statistical methods is
that RA works without the linearity and normality assumptions. It captures
information within nonlinear relations and high-ordinality interactions between the
specified variables. RA uses discrete variables, so continuous variables are discretized.
Although discretization loses information, this may be compensated for by RA's
ability to detect nonlinearities and interaction effects.
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Set-theoretic RA is completely non-statistical and resembles logic design and machine
learning found in the electrical and computer engineering literature (Zwick 2004).

Here is a very brief example illustrating how RA works. The data for this example
consists of six variables. A,B,C,D,E are independent variables assumed to be
predictive of the dependent variable F, which is a binary categorical variable that
indicates whether a loan defaulted. The most complete model is when all the
independent variables are used to explain the behavior of the dependent variable. In
this case, it is the model ABCDEF. This model makes maximum use of the
explanatory power within the data but it is maximally complex and may overfit the
data. Conversely, there is the null model, ABCDE:F, which does not use any of the
independent variables to predict F. It is minimally complex and does not explain the
variation in the dependent variable F in any way.

RA uses information to quantify the explanatory power of a model, which is the
reduction of uncertainty about the dependent variable provided by knowing the input
variables. The null model has 0% information and thus no uncertainty reduction. The
complete model has 100% information and maximum uncertainty reduction.

RA attempts to find the best model that falls in between the null and the complete
model. The best model is determined based on a tradeoff between two criteria: the
model complexity and the goodness of fit. This is accomplished by looking at various
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criteria such as Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), Bayesian Information Criteria
(BIC) and statistical significance relative to a reference model.

Another important criterion is the percent correct measure of the model's accuracy of
prediction. This indicates the ratio of the sum of true negatives and true positives over
the sample population. However, the percent correct measure only is adequate when
the dependent variable states occur equally in the sample population. For example, in
the sample population where the transition is defined as current to 'Paid in Full', the
number of 'Paid in Full' loans should be equal to the number of non-'Paid in Full'
loans. Otherwise, more complex measures of predictive accuracy should be used such
as Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve, and similarly the c-statistic.

RA is used to detect significant interaction effects. For example, a directed RA model
of AB: AC:BC means that the variables A and B have independent effects on the
dependent variable C. The first pair (AB) indicates the independent variables in the
model, and following pairs (AC and BC) indicate the relationship type between an
independent variable and the dependent variable. The model AB:AC:BC says that A
and B separately predict the dependent variable C, these separate effects being
integrated by the maximum entropy principle method. A higher-level model ABC
indicates the independent relation of A and B with C as well as the interaction of A
and B with C. In other words, it embraces the AB:AC:BC relation as well as the
triadic interaction term. If the model AB:AC:BC is not significant (for example,
relative to AB:C as a reference) and the model ABC is significant, the interaction of
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variables A and B to explain C is significant even though the main effects of A and B
are not significant. This is more fully explained in Zwick (2004) and Shervais, Zwick
and Kramer (2005).

RA is used in the following areas, bio-medical data analysis, decision analysis, pattern
recognition, syntactic constraints of languages, and dynamics of cellular automata.
Some papers that applied RA in the literature in ways relevant to this dissertation
research are the following. In his study about the relationship between education,
literacy and health, Carletti (2004) uses RA to detect interaction effects. He looks at
four-way interactions and compares them to the immediate simple ancestor model that
includes all possible three-way interactive relations except the four-way interaction
itself. He notes that the test of significant difference between these models would
identify whether the four-way interaction is significant. For example, the ABCD
model is compared to the ABC: ABD: ACD:BCD model in order to detect a significant
tetradic interaction effect that might be interpretable for understanding the relations
between variables. A successful detection of statistically significant interaction effects
using RA led Carletti to test these interactions in a regression model. He tests
multiplicative and divisive forms and notes some significant interactions that
improved the regression model's overall R .

Mist (2007) wants to improve the feasibility of incorporating Chinese Medicine
diagnosis by prescreening participants using questionnaires. He uses logistic
regression models to predict Chinese Medicine diagnosis and enhances the accuracy of
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these models with RA suggested interaction effects. He finds two interaction terms
using RA which are significant in logistic regression models.

Shervais, Zwick and Kramer (2005) use RA as a tool for identifying gene-to-gene
interactions in studies of human diseases. Detecting interactions with standard
statistical methods is difficult when there is no significant main effect of the two
individual genes. However, their interaction can be significant and can be detected by
RA. RA is robust in these environments and compares favorably with other
approaches including neural network modeling.

Monte Carlo Method
The Monte Carlo method was first introduced by Stanislaw Ulam during the
Manhattan Project. Nicholas and Ulam (1949) use the Monte Carlo method for dealing
with problems in mathematical physics. The method is a probabilistic approach to the
study of differential equations.

Monte Carlo method utilizes random numbers to solve problems by brute force. The
random numbers are either pre-generated or a pseudo random generator function is
used. These random numbers in conjunction with the provided probability distribution
functions create random values for the independent variables of interest. With the use
of specified rules, the synthetic independent variable values generate an "outcome"
sample, interpreted as the dependent variable distribution. Confidence intervals are
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built using that distribution and results are deduced within the given confidence levels.
The results are statistically tested for significance.

Efficiency of the Monte Carlo method depends on the speed of computing machines.
There are specific software packages that utilize Monte Carlo method even in today's
personal computers, providing random number generators that are essential for the
Monte Carlo method.

Monte Carlo method is applied in the mortgage industry for valuation of mortgage
deals. The stochastic behavior of interest rates and housing price appreciations are
generally modeled using the Monte Carlo method. Akesson and Lehoczky (2000)
indicate the importance of the Monte Carlo method for pricing and hedging of
complex, path dependent financial instruments. They develop a low discrepancy
method to enhance the model predictability for mortgage backed securities valuation.

McConnell and Singh (1993), Kau and Keenan (1999), Kau and Kim (1994), Vandell
(1995), Quigley, Deng and Order (1996), Ambrose, Buttimer and Capone (1998),
Capozza, Kazarian and Thomson (1998) all utilize the Monte Carlo method to
simulate the stochastic behavior of interest rates and house price appreciations. This
provides an expected value of a mortgage loan given the different states of the
environment.
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Monte Carlo method is the essence of discrete event simulation (DES). In DES, each
event has a frequency distribution or a timeline distribution. As the complexity of such
systems increase, mathematical solutions to determine the system behavior (such as
queuing theory) cannot be applied easily. Instead, the use of the Monte Carlo method
enables a solution. The outcome is not a closed form solution to the problem but rather
a computed numerical solution for which confidence intervals can be calculated for a
given confidence level.

Logistic Regression
The origin of logistic regression goes back to 19th century. It was invented for the
description of the growth of populations and the course of autocatalytic chemical
reactions. It evolved through various papers and books from Aitchison and Brown
(1957), Berkson (1980) to Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989). A clear explanation of
logistic regression can be found in Tabachnick and Fidell (1996).

Logistic regression is a generalized linear model that utilizes the logit as its link
function (Equation 1).

logit(/>,.) = ln
1-A

= « + A*u+ - + M , «

i = U.,n where

Pi=P(Yt=l)[l]
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There are multiple forms of logistic regression techniques:

•

Binomial Logistic Regression is useful for a binary response variable. A binary
variable only has two possible values, such as presence or absence of a
particular disease.

•

Ordinal Logistic Regression is used for an ordinal response variable. Ordinal
variables are categorical variables that have three or more possible levels with
a natural ordering, such as strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, and
strongly agree.

•

Multinomial Logistic Regression is useful for a nominal response variable
using an iterative-weighted least squares algorithm to obtain maximum
likelihood estimates of the parameters. Multinomial logistic regression uses
nominal variables that three or more categories with no natural ordering.

Binomial logistic regression is used when the dependent variable has two states. If
dependent variable has more than two states that have a natural ordering, ordinal
logistic regression is used, otherwise, multinomial logistic regression is preferred.

Chapter 3 - Methodology
This chapter includes three sections:

•

3.1 Payment model: A new 9-State Markov transition model that is compared
to the 7- state model proposed by DeFranco (2002) in terms of predictive
accuracy.

•

3.2 Interaction effects: A method for detecting (exploratory analysis)
interaction effects using reconstructability analysis and using the interaction
terms to enhance the predictive accuracy of the logistic regressions used in the
payment model.

•

3.3 Data: Description of the Loan Performance dataset, variables and tools
used in the study.

3.1 Payment Model
This section discusses an extension to the model presented by DeFranco (2002). Table
1 summarizes the key models discussed in the literature review, contrasted with the
enhanced 9-State model.
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Model Name
Combined Prepayment and
Default (previous literature)

Number of
Loan States
3

Possible Loan Payment States

Active, Paid Off, Defaulted
Current, 30-days delinquent, 60-days

7-State Model (DeFranco 2002)

7

delinquent, 90+ days delinquent,
Foreclosure, REO, Paid Off
Current, 30-days delinquent, 60-days

Proposed 9-State Model

9

delinquent, 90+ days delinquent, Early
Foreclosure, Late Foreclosure REO, Paid in
Full, Terminated with Loss

Table 1 - Summary and comparison of existing and proposed payment models

One of the drawbacks in DeFranco's model is that there is only one termination status:
'Paid Off. Loans in that status could be 'Terminated with Loss' or 'Paid in Full'. This
separation will enable the modeling framework to identify expected losses for a
mortgage loan. Furthermore, foreclosure is a long process that may take an average of
4-5 months, depending on the state and its corresponding legislation. In earlier stages
of foreclosure, the probability of a loan curing is higher compared to the later stages of
foreclosure due to heavy loan workout by the servicer. Thus, another drawback of
DeFranco's model is that it considers the behavior of 'Late Foreclosure' similar to
'Early Foreclosure'. Table 2 shows all possible transitions between states. The
probability for each transition is denoted as q t xy where the t indicates that each
probability could vary as a function of time (in this case it is one month transition),
and the x-y indicate the starting and ending state. When state changes are not
possible, the corresponding cell has a probability of zero.

30 Days 60 Days 90+ Days
Early
rinln
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EF-R
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R
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LF-L
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0

0

0

0
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0

Paid in Full
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0

0

0

0

0

0

0

l

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

l

qt

0

R-L

REO
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Table 2 - Proposed 9-State payment model transition matrix

To determine the q values, a binomial logistic regression analysis is performed. The
independent variables for these regression models are borrower, loan, and economic
variables relevant to that particular state. The same analysis is conducted for the 7State model using same variables.

For a simple prepayment model example where a loan is either prepaid or active, the
binomial logistic regression form is shown in Equation 2.

log [ P(Prepaid)/P(Active)] = b0 + bi*CreditScore + b2*LoanAmount +...+ b„*LTV

[2]

The probability of a loan prepaying can then be represented as shown in Equation 3.
P(Prepaid) = 1/ {1 + exp [-(b0 + b^CreditScore + b2*LoanAmount +...+ bn*LTV)]}

[3]
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For variables with more than two nominal outcomes, the multinomial logistic
regression is used. For example, if a loan is prepaid, active or defaulted as an outcome,
then the multinomial logistic regression model is shown in Equation 4 and 5.

log[ P(Prepaid)/P(Active)] = bp0 + bpl*CreditScore + bp2*LoanAmount +...+ bpn*LTV

[4]

log[ P(Defaulted)/P(Active)] = bpo + bpl*CreditScore + bp2*LoanAmount +...+ bpn*LTV [5]

Active is the reference group and both equations are solved simultaneously using the
least squares method to derive probabilities for each state of the dependent variable.

Multinomial logistic models are multi-equation models. A response variable with k
categories will generate k-1 equations. For each of these k-1 equations, there is a
binary logistic regression. Multinomial logistic regression simultaneously estimates
the k-1 logits of each binary logistic regression.

The logistic regressions are then utilized by a discrete system simulation model using
Monte Carlo method to simulate the status for the next month given the initial
conditions of a loan. By repeating this process multiple times, the model outputs
monthly statuses for a loan.
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As an example, a '30-days delinquent' loan with given attributes, the multinomial
logistic regression generates transition probabilities to all possible states. Table 3
displays the output of that operation.
Transition
Matrix
starting
from 30days
delinquent
Transition
Probabilities
Cumulative
Transition
Probabilities
Range of
cumulative
Probabilities
Valid
Transition
Flag

Current

30-days
delq.

60-days
delq

90+
days
delq

Early
FC 1/

Late FC

Paid in
Full

REO

Terminated
with Loss

0.6

0.1

0.25

0

0.00

0

0

0.05

0

0.6

0.7

0.95

0.95

0.95

0.95

0.95

1

1

0.0-0.6

0.6-0.7

0.7-0.95

0.950.95

0.950.95

0.950.95

0.950.95

0.95-1

1-1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

Table 3 - Transition matrix illustrating the mechanics of Monte Carlo method

The simulation uses Monte Carlo method to generate random numbers between 0 and
1 using a uniform distribution. For example, Monte Carlo method assigns the number
.563 randomly, the loan transitions into 'Current' status depending on the range of
cumulative probabilities and valid ranges. Another run of Monte Carlo might assign
the random number like .950. Then, the loan will transition to '60-days delinquent'
since '90+ days delinquent', 'Early Foreclosure', 'Late Foreclosure' and 'Real Estate
Owned' (REO) are not valid transitions when the transition starts from '30-days
delinquent' status.

FC means foreclosure.
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Both 7-State and 9-State models are tested for accuracy using the actual data that is
separated from the initial training dataset. The measure of accuracy is the absolute
error of the simulation model results from the real data. The 'Early and Late
Foreclosure' states are aggregated into a single 'Foreclosure' state to enable
comparison between two different models. 'Terminated with Loss' and 'Paid in Full'
states also are aggregated into a single 'Paid Off state. Table 4 displays the
comparison framework. For each status, a statistical comparison test is conducted.

For example, if a loan portfolio shows 300 loans in foreclosure by the 15th period and
the model predicts 250 loans, there is an absolute error of 50. The absolute error is
calculated for each month for both models. The median absolute errors of both models
are statistically tested using a Mann-Whitney U test to compare overall model
performance. The null hypothesis is that the 9-State model is not different from the 7State model in terms of estimating each status. The 9-State model may be considered
an improvement upon the 7-State model, if the significance test indicates that the null
hypothesis is rejected with p<.05. This predictive accuracy comparison methodology
is explained in detail by Diebold and Mariano (1995).

Figure 1 displays the empirical methodology for testing the 9-State payment model's
performance compared to the 7-State model's. The initial step is to collect model
projections from both 7- and 9-State models. This is done by applying the model to a
group of loans from the test data. The next step is to compare the predicted values to
the actual for each month to compute absolute errors for each status for both models.

Lastly, median absolute errors are compared for each model using Mann-Whitney U
test in order to confirm the hypothesis whether the 9-State model is significantly
different and better than the 7-State model.

Monthly
output of the
9-State Model for
each status
Error of
9-State model from
actual for each
status

Monthly Median Error
Comparison of each
status using
Mann Whitney U test

Actual monthly
Results for each
status

Error of 7-State
model from actual
for each status
Monthly
output of the
7-State Model for
each status

9-State model vs.
Model Output

Model vs. Actual

7-State model
>

Figure 1 - Testing scheme for payment model

Formal statistical test of determining the difference between 9-State model vs. 7-State
model goes back to DeFranco (2002). He tests the restrictions implied by the 3-state
model and rejected these restrictions, concluding that the 7-State model is significantly
impacting the accuracy of the predictions (Table 4).
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The 3-state model implies that the probability of paying off is the same, regardless of
the current payment status of the loan. In other words, the 3-state model forces the
coefficients to be the same for all of the transitions to 'Paid Off in the 7-State model.
The Table 4 below shows the differences between these three frameworks.

Loan Payment Statuses by Model
3 - State
Model

Active

7 - State
Model

Current

30

60

90+

9 - State
Model

Current

30

60

90+

FC
Early
FC

Late
FC

Default

Paid Off

REO

Paid Off

REO

Terminated
with Loss

Paid in
Full

Table 4 - Model framework comparison

Table 5 shows the construct of the testing schema of DeFranco. The null hypothesis is
that the 7-State model's 'Default' and 'Paid Off coefficients for each active status is
the same as the 3-State model's 'Default' and 'Paid Off coefficients. Looking at each
logistic regression and testing its significance will help reject the restriction of the 3state model. Wald Chi-Square test is used to test the null hypothesis that the 7-State
model is not different from the 3-state model for 'Paid Off, 'Default' and 'Active'
statuses. He concludes for all statuses that the Wald Chi-square is significant, leading
to the conclusion to reject the restrictions.
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Logistic Regression From Loan Status
3-State Model

7-State Model

Active

Active
„ A"A

To Loan Status
Default Paid Off
„ A-D

^ A- p

qt

qt

qt

„ C-P

Current

qtC"A

qt

30

qt3"A

,-, 3 - D
qt

„ 6-A

60

qt

90+
Foreclosure

„ 6-D

„ 6- p

qt

qt

„ 9-A

„ 9-D

qt

qt
„
qt

„ F- A

qt

„ 3-P

qt

qt
F D

qt

Table 5 - 7-State model restriction tests construct compared to the 3-state model

The difference between the 9-State model and the 7-State model in terms of active
statuses is the separation of foreclosure state into 'Early and Late Foreclosure' states.
Table 6 displays the construct and use of Wald Chi-Square test for the logistic
regression permitting testing the null hypothesis that use of two foreclosure states in 9State model is not different from the single foreclosure state in 7-State model. The
expected result is to see high Wald Chi-Square statistics for regressions specified
below, having p-values smaller than the generally accepted a=.05 confidence level.

Logistic Regression From Loan Status Current 30
7-State Model
9-State Model

60

To Loan Status
90+
Foreclosure Default Paid Off
„ F-P

Foreclosure

qtF"C

qtF"3

qtF"6

qtF"9

qtFF

qtFD

Early Foreclosure

qtEF"C

q^"3

qtEF"6

qtEF"9

q,8"

qtEF"D

qt
qtEF-P

Late Foreclosure

qtLF"C

qtLF"3

qtLF"6

q, L F - 9

qtLF"F

qtLFD

qtLF"P

Table 6 - 9-State model restriction tests construct compared to the 7-State model
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3.2 Interaction Effects
In mortgage literature, different variables are used to model borrowers' behavior, such
as credit score, unpaid balance (UPB), collateral value, LTV ratio, loan age (in
months), property type, purpose of the mortgage, debt to income ratio, state and so
forth. Economic conditions also are used, such as house price appreciation figures and
prevailing interest rates. For example, holding all other variables constant, the
correlation of LTV on default probability is assumed to be positive due to findings in
the literature. However, this correlation does not always hold when the borrower has a
high credit score (FICO). High credit score borrowers tend to maintain good credit
histories and are less likely to default. This interaction effect between LTV and FICO
is incorporated into earlier studies.

Interactions between other variables (for example, unpaid balance and LTV, property
type and collateral value and so forth) might help to further explain borrower's
payment behavior. These possible interactions may be tested by including interaction
variables in the regression models. The interaction variable is the product of the
variables involved in the hypothesized interaction. Including all possible interaction
terms can be computationally tedious to resolve in logistic regressions with more than
ten independent variables.
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Therefore, this research uses RA to study potential interactions between the variables
of logistic regression equations that construct the transition models. RA can detect
interaction effects, as described previously in the RA literature review.

The process for using RA in determining significant interaction effects consists of the
following steps:

•

Selecting a specific payment transition
o

'30-days delinquent' to 'Paid in Full' transition is selected since its one of the
difficult transitions to predict

•

Sampling observations and data manipulation
o

20,000 observations are randomly selected where the DV states are equally
sampled. This is done both for training and testing. Both of them had 10,000
'Paid in Full' and 10,000 non 'Paid in Full' loans.

•

Discretizing continuous variables of interest (some of them are nominal with no need
to discretize)
o

Out of 82 variables used in the logistic regression, 39 are binned
(transformed from a continuous to a categorical variable)

o

All the continuous variables are binned into four bins with number of
observations equally distributed in each bin

o

Optimal binning is chosen to be four equal bins after testing for two, three,
four and five bins per continuous variable; four bins yielded the highest
%correct(training) and %correct(test) results

•

Determining the important variables in order to reduce the possible search space

o

Based on the logistic regression results on the same training sample, the
variables of RA model are limited to the ones that are significant in LR
model. This ensures a significant reduction in computational complexity.

•

Determining the best models based on BIC, AIC, statistical significance and high %
correct results on test population.
o

In order to explore higher level interactions, OCCAM searches more complex
models starting from the initial 'best' models. These yielded more interaction
terms.

•

Confirming the validity of the interaction effects on the test data.
o

•

This is to ensure whether the interaction term is significant in RA.

Adding these new interaction terms to LR model and observing the training and
testing percent correct in order to compare it to the LR model without interactions.

•

Comparing the LR model with interactions to LR model without interactions using
Chi-Square test.

A sample RA output (from the computer program OCCAM) is displayed as Table 7:

MODEL

H

Level

dDF

dLR

Alpha

Inf

%dH(DV)

dAIC

dBIC

%C(Training)

IV:DEHJP

4

10.92

143

18719.3

0 0.727

35.61

18433.3

17211.6

79.24

IV:DHIJP

4

10.93

143

18539.6

0

0.72

35.27

18253.6

17031.9

77.89

IV:CDHJP

4

10.95

71

17405.5

0 0.676

33.11

17263.5

16656.9

77.81

IV:DHJP

3

10.96

35

16927

0 0.658

32.2

16857

16557.9

77.59

IV:CDEHJP

5

10.91

287

19508.4

0 0.758

37.11

18934.3

16482.5

79.81

IV:DEIJP

4

10.93

191

18393

0 0.714

34.99

18011

16379.3

78.63

IV:DHJNP

4

10.96

71

17064.3

0 0.663

32.46

16922.3

16315.7

77.72

IV:DHJKP

4

10.96

71

17004.8

0 0.661

32.35

16862.8

16256.3

77.6

IV:CDHJNP

5

10.95

143

17579.1

0 0.683

33.44

17293.1

16071.4

78.06

IV:CDHJKP

5

10.95

143

17530.4

0 0.681

33.35

17244.4

16022.8

77.85

IV:CDHIJP

5

10.92

287

18989.5

0 0.738

36.13

18415.5

15963.7

78.48

Table 7 - Sample OCCAM output for RA
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In Table 7 the "Model" column shows the alternative models with different
independent variable combinations. The last letter, in this case, P, is reserved for the
dependent variable; the other letters indicate independent variables. For example,
IV:DEHJP means, a model with D, E, H and J as independent variables and P as the
dependent variable. IV stands for the independent variables and a short indication of
all the independent variables. "Inf" column indicates the amount of information in
percentage compared to the full model, which has 100% information, but not shown in
Table 7. "dBIC" and "dAIC" columns are information criteria that take into account
the model simplicity and richness of information. When estimating model parameters
using maximum likelihood estimation, it is possible to increase the likelihood by
adding additional parameters, which may result in over-fitting. The BIC resolves this
problem by introducing a penalty term for the number of parameters in the model.
This penalty for additional parameters is stronger than that of the AIC. In Table 7,
models are sorted by dBIC. These two criteria are used to evaluate model performance
in terms of tradeoff between likelihood ratio and complexity.

The last column, "%correct (training)", shows how well the model fit the training data.
It is the ratio of the sum of true positives and false negatives to the sample size
expressed as a percentage. Using these criteria, one can identify the best model. In
Table 7, the model DEHJP will be the best fit with highest dBIC and a relatively high
%correct (training).

61

Logistic regression model with interaction and logistic regression model without
interaction are compared using the significance of the difference in likelihood ratios of
both models at the overall model level. Difference of likelihood ratios and difference
of degrees of freedom are calculated as:

ALikelihoodRatio = LikelihoodRatio LRint - LikelihoodRatio LRnoim

[6]

ADF = DF LRint -DF LRnoint

[7]

Chi-Square test is utilized to measure whether the difference between the two models
is significant.
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3.3 Data
The dataset used for this research is called the Loan Performance dataset. It consists of
residential subprime mortgage data and it is the largest commercially available dataset
in the industry. It provides both the origination information of mortgage loans and the
monthly snapshots of payment and status information. It has information on 19 million
loans over a 20-year period. This dataset is available to this researcher as an employee
of Wilshire Credit Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Bank of America. The
company is supportive of the research.

Loan Performance Origination Data Table Schema
Columns (continued)
Columns
Servicer Fee Rate
Pool ID
Negative Amortization
Deal No
Loan ID
Negative Amortization Limit
Property Zip
Index ID
State
Margin
Property Type
Periodic Interest Rate Cap
Periodic Interest Rate Floor
Number of units
Occupancy
Periodic Pay Cap
Origination Date
Periodic Pay Floor
Maximum Lifetime Interest Rate
Maturity
First Payment Date
Minimum Lifetime Interest Rate
Origination Amount
Rate Reset Frequency
Pay Reset Frequency
Closing Balance
First Rate Period
Closing Interest Rate
Sale Price
First Pay Period
Appraisal value
Amortization Term
FICO Score
Product Type
Lien Position
Term
Initial Rate
Credit Grade
Debt to Income Ratio
Prepayment Penalty
Loan Type
Prepayment Term
Purpose
First Rate Cap
Payment Frequency
Pledge Amount
Effective LTV
Loan Source
Buydown
First LTV
Documentation
Second LTV
Combined LTV
Convertible Flag
Servicer
Pool Insurance
Originator
Original LTV

Table 8 - Origination Table Fields
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Table 8 shows the static (origination) information of the loans whereas Table 9 has the
dynamic (monthly) information on payment, interest rate, status and so forth.

Loan Performance Dynamic Data Table Schema
Columns

Columns (continued)

Pool ID

Exception

Deal No

Foreclosure Start Date

Loan ID

Foreclosure End Date

Last Interest Paid Date

Payoff Date

Balance

REO Date

Interest Rate

Investor Balance

Total Payment Due

Next Interest Rate

Scheduled Principal Payment

Loss Amt

Scheduled Monthly Payment

Net Pass Through Rate

MBA Method Delinquency Status

Month ID

OTS Method Delinquency Status

Pool Date

Delinquency History
Table 9 - Dynamic Historic Table Fields

Only first lien and fixed loans are modeled. Data is processed and thoroughly cleaned
to avoid missing data issues. Incomplete observations are removed (approximately 5%
of the entire data). The variables used in this research are displayed in Appendix I.

Some variables shown in Appendix I might only apply to specific transitions. For
example, foreclosure variables do not play a role in 'Current' to 'Paid in Full'
transition.
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Chapter 4 - Results

The results are presented in two sections. Section 4.1 gives the results for the 9-State
payment model testing. Section 4.2 presents the results of the '30-days delinquent' to
'Paid in Full' transition model, with regards to the comparison of LR, and LR with
interactions effects.

4.1 Payment Model Results

Payment model testing is presented in two sections. The first part shows the empirical
testing which compares the 7-State model predictions and 9-State model predictions to
the actual data. This comparison emphasizes the improvement in prediction accuracy
achieved by the 9-State model. The second part presents the formal statistical testing
of new statuses introduced by the 9-State model. In other words, it focuses on the
statistical validity of introducing new statuses to the payment model.

Results of Empirical Testing of the 9-State Payment Model

An empirical test is conducted for 40 months into the future, on 1,666 out-of-sample
loans that are initially in foreclosure. The results are compared to the actual. This is a
very stringent test of the model's prediction capability.
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Table 10, below, shows the results of 7-State and 9-State models, actual data and the
comparison criterion which is the error from the actual results, with median absolute
Period
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Current Loans
7state
Actual
50
52
62
68
92
85
89
86
81
88
99
85
86
99
104
89
101
86
106
83
117
84
84
115
111
81
107
79
100
78
99
81
104
78
91
77
94
77
72
96
92
71
84
65
74
57
62
76
74
58
79
56
89
53
82
53
72
53
49
75
73
42
66
47
49
69
65
44
66
41
56
39
62
40
42
65
67
38
67
34
Median Absolute Error

Table 10 - Model comparison data

9state
71
88
98
102
114
110
110
107
110
104
101
97
102
98
94
89
83
85
83
78
81
80
74
70
68
68
63
61
62
53
51
52
50
46
47
47
40
39
37
43

Absolute Error
9-State
7-State
2
21
6
26
7
6
3
13
7
26
14
11
11
13
15
3
9
15
23
2
33
16
31
18
30
9
9
28
22
6
10
18
26
21
14
6
17
11
24
18
21
11
19
4
17
14
6
6
16
11
23
26
36
29
21
10
19
22
26
31
22
14
19
20
19
21
19
19
25
17
9
22
22
23
26
29
30
24
33
12
21

error highlighted at the bottom. These are the results for loans that have not missed
their monthly payments.

Discrepancies are calculated by period (monthly) using errors of model from the
actual data. This is a common measure of forecast error in time series analysis. The
median of these errors are tested for significant difference using the Mann-Whitney U
test. The pairs are 7-State and 9-State errors.

Figure 2 displays from Table 10 the number of loans that are current in their payments
for each period into the future. In this test, since all loans start from foreclosure there
are no current loans initially. A few loans will transition from foreclosure to current in
the first month (50 out of 1,666 in this case). As the number of periods increase, the
transitions of loans in and out of current status determine the number of current loans
for subsequent periods. As shown in Figure 2, this number peaks at 120, ten periods
into the future and then declines slowly.

The solid, dotted and dashed lines indicate the actual data, the 7-State model results,
and the 9-State model results, respectively. The 9-State model results are visually
closer to the actual data on average compared to the 7-State model results.
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The next step is to test whether the median absolute errors for both models are
significantly different than each other. For current loans, the 9-State model median
absolute error is 12, and the 7-State model median absolute error is 20.5, based on the
40 pairs of absolute errors in Table 10. Mann-Whitney U test results using these pairs
indicate that the difference between the two median absolute error figures is
significant (p= 0.003). This suggests that the 9-State model forecasts the number of
current status loans better than the 7-State model.
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Figure 2 - 7-State and 9-State model predictions compared to the actual data for 'Current' loans

The next transition modeled is from foreclosure to 30-days delinquent. This is a less
common transition, so the number of loans is smaller (Figure 3). The shape of the plot
is similar to Figure 2. As shown in Figure 3, for 30-days delinquent loans, the 9-State
model also performs visibly better than the 7-State model. The 9-State model median
absolute error is 4 and the 7-State model median absolute error is 7.5. Mann-Whitney
U test results indicate that the difference between the median absolute errors is
significant (p=0.001). These results indicate that the 9-State model is better than the 7State model for predicting the number of 30-days delinquent loans.
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Figure 3 - 7-State and 9-State model predictions compared to the actual data for thirty day delinquent
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For 60-days delinquent loans, the numbers are smaller still. The 9-State model
predictions look similar to the 7-State model predictions (Figure 4). The 9-State model
median absolute error is 4; while the 7-State model median absolute error is 6.5.
Mann-Whitney U test results indicate that the difference between the median absolute
errors is significant (p=0.026) indicating that the 9-State model performs better than 7State in predicting 60-days delinquent status.
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For 90-days delinquent loans, the numbers are larger, as this is a more common
transition. The shape of the plot is more exaggerated. The 7-State model performs
better compared to the 9-State model (Figure 5). The 9-State model median absolute
error is 39 and the 7-State model median absolute error is 36.5. However, MannWhitney U test results indicate that the difference between the median absolute errors
is not significant with a p-value of 0.206. Both models' absolute error distributions are
not statistically different than each other.
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Most of the loans that start in foreclosure remain in foreclosure for the next few
periods, but over time, most of them eventually become 'Paid Off. In terms of
predicting the number of foreclosure loans, the 9-State model visibly performs better
than the 7-State model (Figure 6). The 9-State model median absolute error is 21;
while the 7-State model median absolute error is 26.5. However, Mann-Whitney U test
results indicate that the difference between the median absolute errors is not
significant (p =0.074).
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A larger number of loans in foreclosure transition to REO (bank owned) loans. The 9State model also performs better than the 7-State model for predicting REO (Figure 7).
The 9-State model median absolute error is 12.5 and the 7-State model median
absolute error is 53.5. In this case, Mann-Whitney U test results indicate that the
difference between the median absolute errors is significant (p <0.001). The 9-State
model outperforms the 7-State model in REO.
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For predicting 'Paid Off loans over time, the 9-State model performs better on the
first 20 periods than the 7-State model (Figure 7). The 9-State model median absolute
error is 32 and the 7-State model median absolute error is 66.5. Mann-Whitney U test
results indicate that the difference between the median absolute errors is significant
(p<0.003). Therefore, the 9-State model is significantly better than the 7-State model
in predicting 'Paid off loans.
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Even though the preceding analysis provides compelling evidence that the 9-State
model is superior to the 7-State model, additional tests are performed in the next
section to verify the separation of 'Foreclosure' and 'Paid Off statuses.

Results of Formal Statistical Testing of Adding More States
This subsection presents the results of formally testing the addition of two states to the
Markov model. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 9-State model should have significant
Wald Chi-square test results for each individual LR models (for each state transition)
to be valid.

Wald Chi-square test is chosen for its strictness compared to the log likelihood
statistics and score statistics. It tests the null hypothesis that all the regression
coefficients are equal to zero. Not rejecting the null hypothesis associated with any of
the transitions introduced by the new statuses will tend to invalidate the usefulness of
the additional statuses.

Table 11 shows the Wald Chi-square hypothesis test results for the two new
foreclosure states.

Wald Chi-Square Results
From\
To
Early
FC

Late FC

Current

30

60

90+

Foreclosure

REO

Paid Off

6768.4,
df=19
p<.0001

1700.6,
df=17,
p<.0001

1222.0,
df=14,
p<.0001

3474.8,
df=22,
p<.0001

24227.9,
df=38,
p<.0001

8782.20,
df=37,
p<.0001

3181.8,
df=18
p<.0001

3580.8,
df=3,
p<.0001

1157.1,
df=6,
p<.0001

565.9,
df=4,
p<.0001

2065.0,
df=11,
p<.0001

4006.6,
df=40,
p<.0001

4675.86,
df=17,
p<.0001

1993.0,
df=15
p<.0001

Table 11 - Testing the validity of splitting foreclosure into 'Early and Late Foreclosure' statuses
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As shown in Table 11, the p-values for each transition show that all of the null
hypotheses are rejected; indicating that splitting foreclosure into two statuses is valid
from a statistical perspective.

Table 12 shows the hypothesis test results for the new 'Paid Off statuses.

Wald Chi Square Results
Loss
Paid Off
FromYTo
N/A
1233.2, df=10, p<.0001
Current
N/A
9001.2,
df=18, p<.0001
30
N/A
4099.0, df=31, p<.0001
60
956.5, df=12, p<.0001
2320.3, df=21, p<.0001
90+
3181.8, df=18p<.0001
Early Foreclosure 757.9 df=14, p<.0001
1993.0, df=15p<.0001
Late Foreclosure 806.2, df=9, p<.0001
Table 12 - Testing the validity of splitting 'Paid off status into 'Terminated with Loss' and 'Paid in
Full' statuses

Similarly, Table 12 displays that splitting 'Paid Off status into two new statuses,
'Terminated with Loss' and 'Paid in Full', yields statistically valid results. The null
hypothesis implied by each transition is rejected with high confidence. This means that
splitting "Paid Off" status into two new statuses is statistically valid.
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4.2 Interaction Effects and Reconstructability Analysis Results

The hypothesis testing the usefulness of RA is:

-

RA can suggest interactions that would significantly improve the performance
oftheLR.

'30-days delinquent' to 'Paid in Full' transition is chosen to test this hypotheses. Two
sample populations are created; 20,000 for training and 20,000 for test. The dependent
variable, binary variable indicating whether a loan is 'Paid in Full' or not, is equally
distributed in both the training and test samples. Each continuous variable is binned
into four equally numbered bins, which are better than two, three and five number of
bins, by rank order in both the training and test populations. The binning results are
compared based on overall model %correct (training) and %correct (test) but not
separately for each variable in a univariate fashion. Stepwise regression is set to run at
.05 significance for a variable to enter and stay in the model. Results are shown in
Table 13.
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The percentage of correct results are 64.26% on training population and 64.28% on the
testing population.

Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter
DF Estimate Standard Error Waid Chi- Square Pr>ChiSq
Intercept
0.3776
4.9961
175.0481
<.0001
app„ value
3.95E-07
1.68E-06
18.0688
<.0001
0.000266
57.1277
fico
-0.00201
<.0001
0.00144
cltv
0.0164
129.8234
<.0001
Arm rate
0.1267
0.016
62.8637
<.0001
remaining_upb
8.40E-07
8.4094
0.0037
2.44E-06
interest_pmts
-0.00096
0.000092
108.7677
<.0001
0.00054
months_to_ppp
12.5847
0.0004
0.00192
ever_30
0.00293
0.0171
0.00699
5.681
0.3028
162.6787
hpa_12_months
-3.8618
<.0001
<.0001
hpa_o_months
-0.7743
0.1
59.9023
0.064
unemployment_change_9
0.0163
15.5149
<.0001
unemployment__change_orig
0.0119
-0.058
23.8032
<.0001
mba_stat_1_c
0.2223
0.018
152.4563
<.0001
0.0202
mba_stat_2_3
-0.1864
85.3971
<.0001
mba_stat_2_6
-0.3166
0.0425
55.399
<.0001
mba_stat_3_c
0.4255
0.0631
45.4999
<.0001
0.0640
mba_stat_3_3
0.2788
18.6023
<.0001
0.0737
mba_stat_3_6
0.19
6.651
0.0099
0.0442
prop_condo_flag
0.1139
6.6268
0.01
prop_other_flag
-0.2211
0.0439
25.3779
<.0001
occp_owner_flag
0.0573
0.0246
5.4283
0.0198
ppp_2y_flag
0.0514
0.1381
7.2264
0.0072

Table 1 3 - L R results

In order to search faster, RA starts with the variables that are identified in the LR
results shown in Table 13. One specific model performed better than LR,
IV: AiBoZ: AkApZ: AsCaZ:CkZ, with a percent correct value of 64.27% on training
and 64.40% on the test data, both slightly better than the LR results. This model
consists of only 7 variables, which are cltv (Ai), arm rate (Ak), interest pmts (Ap),
ever_30 (As), hpa_o_months (Bo), mba_stat_l_c (Ca), mba_stat_3_c (Ck) compared
to the 22 variables used by LR model.

Further RA search using dAIC, dBIC, significance and %correct (test) as the model
selection criteria revealed eight "interesting" interaction effects: AiAp, AiBo, AkAp,
ApBo, BoCa, ArBo, AsCa, and AsBo. These are the most commonly identified
interactions from the best models of each RA run. These interactions are then tested in
RA for significance (Table 14) and also tested in LR for significance within the
stepwise selection procedure (Table 15).

dDF
MODEL
Level H
IV:AiApZ
0 14.1474
15
IV:AiZ:ApZ
1 14.14B6
6
9
Significance Test
0 14.1455
IV:AiBoZ
15
1 14.1489
6
IV:AiZ:BoZ
9
Significance Test
IV:AkApZ
0 14.1448
15
1 14.1468
6
IV:AkZ:ApZ
9
Significance Test
IV:ApBoZ
0 14.139
15
IV:ApZ:BoZ
1 14.1405
6
9
Significance Test
0 14.1231
7
IV:BoCaZ
IV:BoZ:CaZ
1 14.1233
4
3
Significance Test
0 14.1446
IV:ArBoZ
15
1 14.1461
IV:ArZ:BoZ
6
9
Significance Test
IV:AsCaZ
0 14.1293
7
IV:AsZ:CaZ
1 14.1298
4
3
Significance Test
IV: AsBoZ
0 14.106
15
IV:AsZ:BoZ
1 14.1076
6
9
Significance Test

dLS
467.35
433.65
33.70
519.46
426.02
93.43
539.59
483.57
56.01
699.82
659.53
40.29
1.140.20
1,136.43
3.77
544.51
502.63
41.89
968.93
956.30
12.63
1,615.22
1,570.19
45.03

Alpha
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.288
0.000
O.OOQ
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.006
0.000
0.000
0.000

ZdH(DV) dAIC
dBIC
XC(Data) ZC(Test)
Inf
0.0271
1.6856 437.3486 318.7962
56.51
56.705
0.0251
1.564 421.6455 374.2246
56.395
56.81
Interaction AiApZ is signifcantly better than AiZ:ApZ
56.725
56.78
0.0301
1.8735 489.4569 370.9045
0.0247
1.5366 414.0226 366.6017
55.94
56.61
Interaction AiBoZ is signifcantly better than AiZ:BoZ
0.0312
1.9461 509.5855 391.0331
56.76
57.265
1.7441 471.5728 424.1519
56.445
57.065
0.028
Interaction AkApZ is signifcantly better than AkZ:ApZ
0.0405
2.5241 669.8191 551.2668
58.15
58.915
0.0382
2.3787 647.5253 600.1044
57.75
58.535
Interaction ApBoZ is signifcantly better than ApZ:BoZ
4.1124 1126.1993 1070.8748
60.47
0.066
59.685
0.0658
4.0988 1128.4307 1096.8167
59.685
60.47
Interaction BoCaZ is not signifcantly better than BoZ:CaZ
395.962
57.135
0.0315
1.9639 514.5143
56.835
57 135
0.0291
1.8128 490.6281 443.2072
56.835
Interaction ArBoZ is signifcantly better than ArZ:BoZ
0.0561
3.4947
954.93 899.6056
60.04
60.29
3.4491 948.3006 916.6866
60.235
0.0554
59.99
Interaction AsCaZ is signifcantly better than AsZ:CaZ
0.0935
5.8257 1585.2238 1466.6715
61.245
61.805
0.0909
5.6633 1558.1904 1510.7694
60.84
61.755
Interaction AsBoZ is signifcantly better than AsZ:BoZ

Table 14 - RA interaction tests

The confirmatory RA test results indicate that all interactions suggested except BoCa
(hpa_o_months * mba_stat_l_c), are significant interactions. BoCa has been selected
as an "interesting" term because it is often identified in the more complex exploratory
RA models. The BoCa interaction did turn out to be significant in the LR results
displayed in Table 15. This interesting result is discussed further in Chapter 5.
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Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter
DF Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi Square Pr> ChiSq RA Code
Intercept
1.1186
2.2879
0.1304
0.7395
Ap
interest_pmts
-0.00162
0.000157
105.7106
<.0001
cltv
84.2365
<.0001
Ai
0.0511
0.00557
mba_stat_2_c
0.1644
0.0202
65.9593
<.0001
Cf
0.00277
ever_30*mba_stat_1_c
-0.0214
59.7712
<.0001
AsCa
-0.002
fico
0.000282
50.1831
<.0001
Ag
months_to_ppp
0.0131
0.00193
45.9248
<.0001
Ar
43.927
mba_stat_3_c
0.2438
0.0368
<.0001
Ck
ever_30
0.0969
41.5647
<.0001
As
0.015
cltv*hpa_o_months
-0.028
41.3678
<.0001
AiBo
0.00435
months_to*hpa_o_months
-0.00937
0.00147
40.7376
<.0001
ArBo
-0.0558
0.0107
27.4504
<.0001
AsBo
ever_30*hpa_o_months
prop_other_flag
-0.2263
0.0441
26.3734
<.0001
E
Arm_rate*interest_pmts
0.000108
0.000023
22.8717
<.0001
AkAp
hpa_o_months
1.697
0.3711
20.9066
<.0001
Bo
hpa__12._months
-6.4925
1.4357
20.4506
<.0001
Bn
app_value
1.74E-06
4.04E-07
18.4876
<.0001
L
unemployment_change_orig
0.0121
16.1109
<.0001
Bt
-0.0485
0.0499
<.0001
R
doc_full__flag
0.1953
15.3283
remaining_upb
0.000013
3.67E-06
0.0006
An
11.8295
doc_low_flag
0.1761
0.0516
11.66
0.0006
S
unemployment change 9
0.056
0.0164
11.6445
0.0006
Br
mba_stat_2_6
-0.1401
0.0416
11.3305
0.0008
Ch
seasoning_by_orig_Da
-0.0046
9.6839
0.0019
Am
0.00148
mba stat 3 3
0.1138
0.0367
9.6001
CI
0.0019
hpa_o_mon*mba_stat. .1 _c
0.2401
0.0021
0.0781
9.455
BoCa
orig_amt
-9.37E-06
6.9632
0.0083
K
3.55E-06
prop..condo flag
0.1158
6.7834
0.0092
B
0.0445
ppp_2y_flag
0.1318
0.0517
6.5081
0.0107
Ac
doc_nodoc. flag
0.1977
T
0.0776
6.4978
0.0108
occp_owner_flag
0.0579
0.0247
5.4836
0.0192
G
hpa_9_months
3.7027
1.8059
4.2037
0.0403
Bm
Arm_rate
0.0474
Ak
0.0493
0.0249
3.9321

Table 15 - LR with interaction terms included

Out of eight interactions determined by RA model, the six highlighted in Table 15 are
found to be significant in the best fit LR model with all eight included. These
interactions are meaningful from the mortgage business perspective. The LR model
with these six interactions achieves 64.68% correct on training population and 64.95%
on testing population. These results are better than the LR model without interactions
by .42% and .67%, respectively, for the training and test populations.

The % correct values on the test data for LR and LR with interactions tend to support
the hypothesis, but further testing is needed to determine the significance of this
results.

The Chi-square test considers two parameters: the difference in likelihood ratio and
the difference in the degrees of freedom. It also requires that the models of comparison
are hierarchically related. The null hypothesis is that the initial LR model without
interactions and LR model with interaction effects are not significantly different. Here
are the results:

Ho: ALR=0
A L R = LikelihoodRatiOLRinteraction- LikelihoodRatio L R_no_interaction

ALR = 2472.7133-2273.2040 = 199.5093
AL/J"1 = UrLRinteraction ~ J-^LRnointeraction

ADF = 33-22 =11
Chi-Square (199.5093, 11) < .0001

The null hypothesis can be clearly rejected, as the LR model with RA-suggested
interaction effects is significantly better than the LR model with no interactions.
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Chapter 5 -Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter consists of two sub-sections. Section 5.1 and 5.2 summarize the research
results, state the contributions, discuss the implications, list the limitations, and
identify the possible future research related to the 9-State payment model and
interaction effects results, respectively. Section 5.3 summarizes the overall
significance of the study.

5.1 9-State Payment Model Discussion
In the first phase of the research, a 9-State mortgage payment transition model is
presented and its forecast accuracy is compared to a 7-State model introduced by
DeFranco (2002). DeFranco points out that his 7-State model could be further
improved by adding and testing more payment statuses. This dissertation introduces
new statuses, 'Early Foreclosure' and 'Late Foreclosure' to replace 'Foreclosure.' A
loan that is early in the foreclosure process is observed to have higher cure rates
compared to the later stages. Thus, the foreclosure status is split in order to incorporate
this observation and improve predictive accuracy. It also introduces 'Terminated with
Loss' and 'Paid in Full' statuses to replace 'Paid Off status. The increasing loss
exposure risk on mortgage portfolios requires the separation of 'Paid Off status in
order to enable the model to distinguish loss loans from the fully paid off loans.
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In order to make the comparison fair, the models are estimated using the same
estimation methodology (logistic regression) and the same training and test data. The
9-State model is significantly better in predicting five statuses, 'Current', '30-days
delinquent', '60- days delinquent', 'REO' and 'Paid off. The 7-State model and 9State model are statistically indifferent when predicting '90- days delinquent' and
'Foreclosure' statuses.

In addition to these status prediction tests, the "restrictions" of the 7-State model
compared to the 9-State model also are formally tested. Looking at the Table 16
below, based on DeFranco (2002), "restriction" of 3-State model over the 7-State
model is the use of 'Active' status, instead of the five separate statuses 'Current',
'30','60','90+','Foreclosure'. In order to justify these additional states, the
"restriction" should be rejected. In other words, addition of more states should be
statistically tested using Wald Chi-square and the null hypotheses that each new
logistic regressions coefficient is not different from zero should be rejected. In the 7State model, there are two "restrictions" implied over the 9-State model, 'foreclosure'
and 'Paid Off statuses.

Loan Payment Statuses by Model
3 - State
Model

Active

7 - State
Model

Current

30

60

90+

9 - State
Model

Current

30

60

90+

FC
Early
FC

Late
FC

Default

Paid Off

REO

Paid Off

REO

Terminated
with Loss

Paid in Full

Table 16 - Model Comparison Framework
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This dissertation tests the removal of two restrictions: 1) having a single 'Foreclosure'
status instead of 'Early and Late Foreclosure', and 2) having a single 'Paid Off status
instead of 'Terminated with Loss' and 'Paid in Full' statuses. A Wald Chi-square test
is used to formally validate the increase in the number of statuses to nine.

The main academic contribution of the 9-State model is the resulting improvement in
accuracy. It provides better forecasts for delinquency, default, loss and prepayment.

Another important academic contribution is the introduction of 'Terminated with
Loss' status. Even though loss projections are not presented in the results section, the
model framework enables the user to predict the frequency of loss.

The 9-State model also contributes to the current business environment. It is used in
Wilshire Credit Corporation15 to predict future statuses of mortgage loans. This
information then is used to anticipate near future resource needs (employees to handle
loan processing needs). This model also is utilized to price servicing rights of a
portfolio, since the price of servicing rights directly depends on the status of the
various loans in the portfolio. A more crucial potential application is pricing of
wholly-owned mortgage loans which is a multi- billion dollar business that features
high yields when assets are correctly priced.

Wilshire Credit Corporation is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bank of America.
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Improved accuracy and having an additional loss status has four important
implications:

1. The model becomes the state-of-the-art in the default, prepayment and loss
literature. It is stated by DeFranco (2002) as possible future work to add new
statuses and to test the validity of these new statuses. This is a valuable
academic implication.

2. The model enables mortgage investors, mortgage servicers and rating
companies to better predict delinquencies, defaults, prepayments and losses for
pricing the mortgages, pricing the servicing rights, and assigning bond ratings
as well as generating accurate cash flows into the future for better management
of mortgage related assets. This is a valuable business implication.

3. This model, also, is useful to identify the recidivism rate of loan
modifications16 currently supported by government under different economic
17

stability programs. The model can better predict the recidivism rate of such
borrowers in order to optimize an exit strategy for the loan. This is an
important economic implication.
16

Modification means change of term, interest rate or unpaid balance to help the borrower make future

payments.
17

FHA program for refinancing, ASF Fast-track program for modification, TARP program for

repurchasing troubled assets etc.
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4. This model can be used to rank servicers in a more accurate fashion. Business
models rank servicers generating expected results for a portfolio of loans on a
historical basis. Then the expected results get compared to the actual results.
So, servicers can be ranked based on how well they perform against the
expected results. Again, an important business implication.

For future predictability, the model needs to have an accurate house price index,
unemployment and interest rate projections. These three variables are exogenous to
the model. This is a limitation because the 9-State model accuracy is limited to the
accuracy of the projections of these economic variables.

The 9-State model uses borrowers credit scores based on the origination date of the
loan. This is a limitation since credit can change through time: yet it is a very
important indicator of determining the likelihood of prepaying or defaulting based on
Ambrose and Buttimer (2000). This limitation can be resolved only when credit score
data is available monthly.

Another important limitation to the 9-State model is the changes in the government
and/or business regulations. For example, a recently initiated government program
named TARP can drastically lower the accuracy of the predictions of the model.
There are also regulations from government induced business alliances such as HOPE

18

Troubled Asset Relief Program launched by government in last quarter of 2008.

86

NOW Alliance and ASF Fast Track Modification Program. The most recent one
established is the Homeownership Affordability and Stability Plan by the government
as of February 17th, 2009. Such programs can initiate an easy way of refinancing, or a
foreclosure moratorium which alters the basic dynamics of the payment model
fundamentally. Even a slight disturbance in any of the transitions within the payment
model will yield inaccurate projections of the future.

There are three specific future research related areas to the 9-State model. The first is
to complement the loss frequency predictions with models that predict the severity of
loss, in order to determine the overall expected loss on a portfolio.

A second future research project could involve the separation of 'REO', and '90-days
delinquent' into more statuses. One must ask, however, 'How many more statuses can
be involved?' A statistician might answer 'As long as the Wald Chi-square tests are
significant, more statuses can be usefully included in the model'. A practical business
person might answer 'As long as the forecast accuracy increases and the model
remains intuitively interpretable.' There is no statistical test or a goodness of fit
measure established to answer the question of parsimony versus accuracy. Since
models similar to the 9-State model are actively used in the business world, accuracy
seems to be valued over parsimony in such business environments.

American Securitization Forum.
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A third potential future research topic would be to incorporate more economic and
geographic variables into the logistic regressions of the payment model. Such
variables might be, but not limited to, home purchase supply and demand within a
given geographic area and regional house affordability. Adding such variables may
increase accuracy.

5.2 Interaction Effects and Reconstructability Analysis Discussion
The second phase of the research presents the use of reconstructability analysis as a
methodology to detect interaction effects. Interaction effects in mortgage prepayment,
default and loss literature are studied and emphasized by Hendershott and Schultz
(1993), Ambrose, Capone, and Deng (2001), Lacour-Little, Marschoun and Maxam
(2002). In this research, RA-suggests interaction effects are hypothesized to enhance
the predictability of logistic regressions.

RA is a method for analyzing multivariate categorical data (Zwick and Johnson 2004)
and so is LR. However, LR has the advantage of being able to process continuous data
whereas RA can more effectively utilize interaction terms and non-linear relationships.
Combinations of these methodologies are expected to yield better results. Carletti
(2004) detects interaction effects using RA and utilized this knowledge to enhance the
regression analysis conducted in his research. The present research extends this
methodology to enhance the logistic regression models in the mortgage payment
model framework.
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The transition from '30-days delinquent' to 'Paid in Full' is selected to investigate the
above hypotheses because it is both useful and difficult to predict. All training and test
data are the same for each methodology.

First, the LR model is trained with no interactions. The resulting model achieves a
64.28% correct result on the test data using 22 independent variables. Eight
interactions are derived from multiple RA runs as the most "interesting" interaction
effects based on different overall model selection criteria such as dBIC, dAIC and %
correct on test data. A logistic regression model that includes the eight RA-suggested
interactions then is trained and tested. This model scores 64.95% correct on the test
data using 32 variables including the six of the eight interactions suggested by RA.

A confirmatory interaction significance test is also conducted using RA for each of the
eight suggested interactions; the results indicates that seven of the eight interactions
are significant except for BoCa (hpa_o_months * mba_stat_l_c). Interestingly, this
interaction is significant in the LR model with interactions.

The term BoCa represents the interaction effect of variables, house price appreciation
from the loan origination and a binary variable that indicates whether the loan is
current last months. It is coded as hpa_o_months * mba_stat_l_c in the logistic
regression model. Even though, the confirmatory test in RA indicates no significant
effect on its own, it is significant in the logistic regression model that incorporates
RA-suggested interaction effects. This suggested that the interaction term might be

significant in the absence of either Bo (hpa_o_months) or Ca (mba_stat_l_c) which
can be justified by looking at Tables 13 and Tables 15, respectively. Ca
(mba_stat_l_c) is present in LR without interaction, but it is absent in the LR with
interactions.

The hypothesis is tested using Chi-square tests to identify significant differences in the
likelihood ratio of compared models. The LR model with RA-suggested interactions
outperformed the LR model with no interactions.

Overall, the hypothesis tests and accuracy comparisons indicate that RA can suggest
interactions that significantly will improve the performance of logistic regressions of
the payment model. Even though this improvement might be small in terms of
percentage increase in accuracy (.67%), it might imply a significant amount of
savings. For example, out of 10,000 mortgage loans which are 30-days delinquent, if
the model predicts with a .67% increase in accuracy, it means that 67 more loans will
be predicted accurately. Assuming an average balance of a mortgage loan is around
$250,000, the accuracy will apply to a total balance of approximately $16,750,000.
From an investor perspective, more accuracy on such a balance is important.

The RA and the interaction terms research leads to two important discussions that are:

•

Missing independent variable states in the test data that don't get scored

•

Computational limitations of OCCAM and SAS

As the complexity increases in OCCAM, more variables or interaction terms get
introduced increasing the predictability. However, the difference between %correct
(training) and %correct (test) increases dramatically as the complexity increases. This
is primarily due to the observations in the test data that OCCAM is not able to
generate their probabilities. This is because the RA method only can generate
probabilities for combinations of independent variable states that exist in the training
data. When such combinations do not exist, OCCAM assigns the probabilities of the
independence model.

This issue is called over-fitting. An over-fit model is too specialized for the data it is
trained with such that it performs poorly against a random out-of-sample population.
Consequently, as OCCAM introduces more variables, the RA model becomes over-fit;
in other words, performs poorly on the out-of-sample population.

One way to resolve this issue will be to enable OCCAM to intelligently remove one
variable at a time in order to obtain simpler models, and thereby generate probabilities
for these observations. This may significantly increase the predictive power of RAmodels identified by OCCAM. This is an important future work.

Another important consideration is the computational time and the memory resources
required by both OCCAM (web-based RA tool) and SAS (the statistical software
used) to evaluate RA and LR models, respectively. Even though LR took less than a
minute to find the optimal model with no interaction effects, it is impossible to
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conduct a search for all possible models that include interaction effects of two or more
variables (factorial design) in SAS due to memory issues. The OCCAM algorithm,
however, is able to start searching for models (in a way that can potentially include all
possible models) without an initial set up. It faces computational difficulty regarding
both the computation time and the memory space because the search space grows
exponentially with the increasing model complexity in terms of the number of
variables and the number of interactions. Some OCCAM runs stopped with no error
notification, and some were aborted due to low memory. Given a starting list of
variables (from LR), OCCAM is able to do exploratory searches that include
interactions of two or more variables, and is useful in identifying important
interactions effects. SAS is not able to set up the factorial design to do such an
exploratory search.

As mentioned earlier, OCCAM can generate high level models with interactions, but
as the number of variables increase and model complexity increases, the number of
computations needed exceeds OCCAM'S capacities. This can be addressed partially
through hardware (e.g. parallel computing or cutting edge systems) and partially
through software improvements (better implementations). This also is an important
area for future work.
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5.3 Conclusions
This research tests a 9-State mortgage payment model in comparison to the 7-State
model presented in the literature. The 9-State model adds 'Early Foreclosure' and
'Late Foreclosure' statuses replacing the single 'Foreclosure' status, and 'Terminated
with Loss' and 'Paid in Full' statuses replacing the single 'Paid Off status. The
addition of these states is tested formally using Wald Chi-square tests. The tests
validate the addition of these states from a statistical perspective. The results of 9State model also are empirically tested against the 7-State model using a large sample
of loans that are initially in foreclosure. These results indicate that 9-State model has
significantly improves accuracy over 7-State model on five of the seven loan payment
statuses over a period of 40 months into the future.

This research also demonstrates that reconstructability analysis is helpful in detecting
and suggesting interactions effects that can be used in the logistic regression models
within the payment model framework. It suggests six new interaction effects to the
logistic regression model, regarding the transition from '30-days delinquent' to 'Paid
in Full'. It improves the accuracy (measured in percent correct) by 0.67%. This
increase is significant at the model level based on the Chi-square test conducted on the
difference of likelihood ratios and difference of degrees of freedom.
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Appendix A - Variables
prop_sfr_flag

seasoning_by_orig_Date

prop_condo_flag
prop_2_4_units_flag

pmts_owed

hpa_3_months
hpa_6_months

prop_pud_flag

pmts_made
remainingupb

hpa_9_months
hpa_12_months

prop_other_flag
prop_noinfo_flag

principal_pmts
interest_pmts

hpaomonths

occp_owner_flag
occp_second_home_flag

unemployment

occp_investor_flag
occp_other_flag

ever_30
ever_60

unemployment_change_9
unemployment_change_12
unemployment_change_orig

orig_amt
appvalue

ever_90
state

mba_stat_l_c
mba_stat_l_3

term
init_rate

judicial_state

mba_stat_l_6

fc_time
fccost

mba_stat_l_9
mba_stat_l_F

purp_nocashrefi_flag

bk_time
bkcost

mba_stat_2_c
mba_stat_2_3

purp_other_flag
doc_full flag

delinq_tax_rate
fc_trans_tax_perc

mba_stat_2_6

doc_low_flag
docnodocflag

reo_time
reo_variable_expense

pppjlag
pppflagmissing

reo_eviction_cost
reotrashout
reo_fixed_closing_cost

purp_purchase_flag
purp_cashrefi_flag

PPP_2y_flag
PPP_3y_flag
PPP_5y_flag
PPP_ly_flag
fico
Itv
cltv
Fixed_rate
fixedfees
Arm_rate
Arm_fees_points
Arm margin

months_to_ppp

reo_broker_fee
reo_trans_tax_perc
arm_interest_rate_difference
fixed_interest_rate_difference
prob_neg_equity
term_120_flag
term_180_flag
term_240_flag
term_300_flag
term_360_flag
term 480 flag

unemployment_change_3
unemployment_change_6

mba_stat_2_9
mba_stat_2_F
mba_stat_3_c
mba_stat_3_3
mba_stat_3_6
mba_stat_3_9
mba_stat_3_F
int_rate_chg_3
int_rate_chg_6
int_rate_chg_9
int_rate_chg_12
int_rate_chg_3_arm
int_rate_chg_6_arm
int_rate_chg_9_arm
int_rate_chg_12_arm
months_in_foreclosure
months in reo

